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I. Introduction 
Arbitration, as reflected through the Federal Arbitration Act 
(FAA),1 is “simply a matter of contract between the parties.”2 This 
oft-cited “fundamental principle”3 reflects an indisputable 
“axiom,”4 but one which the Circuit Courts of Appeals have failed 
to apply consistently. Courts diverge as to whether a party 
resisting arbitration must show prejudice in order to prove that 
its opponent waived its right to arbitrate.5 This Note 
demonstrates not only that prejudice is unnecessary, but that the 
waiver doctrine itself is conceptually flawed. In its place, this 
Note proposes a multifactor judicial framework derived from 
generally applicable contract law principles—a reasonableness 
test. 
The standard conception is that “parties agree to use 
arbitration—to use private judges rather than public court judges 
to resolve their disputes—because arbitration is a process that 
improves upon the court system for dispute resolution.”6 Indeed, 
arbitration is a private,7 alternative adjudicatory forum to which 
one gains access by contract.8 Although the “default forum of 
dispute resolution is litigation,” parties can “override the 
                                                                                                     
 1. See 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (2011).  
 2. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995).  
 3. Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2776 (2010). 
 4. AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648 
(1986).  
 5. Gary Born, Implied Waiver of the Right to Arbitrate, KLUWER 
ARBITRATION BLOG (Aug. 30, 2011), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/ 
011/08/30/implied-waiver-of-the-right-to-arbitrate/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2011) 
(framing the issue as whether “prejudice on the part of a resisting party is 
necessary for an opposing party’s right to compel arbitration to be deemed 
waived”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 6. Christopher R. Drahozal, Why Arbitrate? Substantive Versus 
Procedural Theories of Private Judging, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 163, 163 (2011) 
[hereinafter Drahozal, Why Arbitrate]. 
 7. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Forum 
Accessibility: Empirical Evidence, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 813, 816 (2008) 
[hereinafter Drahozal, Arbitration Costs] (“Arbitration is private dispute 
resolution.”). 
 8. See Christopher R. Drahozal & Quentin R. Wittrock, Is There a Flight 
from Arbitration?, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 71, 76 (2008) (noting that parties can be 
compelled to arbitrate only “if they have agreed to do so . . . by entering into an 
arbitration agreement”).  
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litigation default rule” by contracting to do so.9 This notion, 
however, begs the question: Why would a party contractually 
relinquish its right to seek legal recourse in court? The 
justifications for doing so are ubiquitous,10 but can be reduced to 
a veritable cost–benefit analysis.11 If the projected benefits of 
arbitration outweigh those of litigation in relation to the costs 
surrounding each regime, the parties will choose to arbitrate.12 
Herein lies the critical contractual freedom provided by 
arbitration. Parties attempting to curb the costs and diminish the 
risks appurtenant to their contractual arrangements13 can tailor 
arbitral procedures designed to accomplish those very 
objectives.14 
Typically, the arbitration clause—a binding agreement 
entered into before a dispute arises—is the key which grants 
access to the arbitral forum and denotes the parties’ arbitral 
                                                                                                     
 9. See Drahozal, Why Arbitrate, supra note 6, at 165.  
 10. See, e.g., id. at 163 (“[A]rbitration may be preferred to litigation because 
it is cheaper and faster; because it enables parties to pick a decision maker (the 
arbitrator) who is an expert in the field; or because it provides a neutral 
forum . . . among other reasons.”); George A. Bermann, The “Gateway” Problem 
in International Commercial Arbitration, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (2012) (“[A]ll 
participants . . . have an interest in ensuring that arbitration delivers the 
various advantages associated with it, notably speed, economy, informality, 
technical expertise, and avoidance of national fora . . . .”). 
 11. See Drahozal, Arbitration Costs, supra note 7, at 833 (noting the 
importance of “[c]omparing the costs of arbitration with the costs of 
litigation . . . in evaluating the efficiency of the two processes”).  
 12. See infra Part II (discussing the cost–benefit analysis conducted by 
parties in determining whether to arbitrate or litigate certain disputes).  
 13. This Note will not confront the numerous social issues surrounding 
consumer and employment arbitration clauses in contracts of adhesion. Such 
issues have been the subject of intense debate among scholars and 
commentators, and are outside the parameters of this Note. Avoiding this issue, 
however, has allowed this Note to focus squarely on the doctrinal underpinnings 
of arbitration in formulating an alternative to the waiver doctrine. Focusing on 
the doctrine surrounding this issue mirrors the Supreme Court’s approach in 
addressing other arbitral issues. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 
131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011) (finding a state law which held class arbitration 
waivers unconscionable preempted by the FAA, and stating that although the 
“rule is limited to adhesion contracts, . . . the times in which consumer contracts 
were anything other than adhesive are long past”).  
 14. See Drahozal, Why Arbitrate, supra note 6, at 177 (noting that parties 
can devise procedures to fit “the type of contract or perhaps even the type of 
dispute” they foresee as potentially arising from that contract).  
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rights.15 Title 9, § 2 of the United States Code governs the 
validity and enforcement of such agreements.16 The Supreme 
Court recently provided a concise articulation of § 2’s substantive 
mandate: “FAA [§ 2] . . . places arbitration agreements on an 
equal footing with other contracts . . . and requires courts to 
enforce them according to their terms. Like other contracts, 
however, they may be invalidated by generally applicable 
contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.”17 
The FAA also establishes procedural mechanisms by which 
federal courts implement § 2’s substantive mandate.18 Section 3 
requires courts to stay litigation, pending arbitration of any 
claims falling within the scope of the parties’ arbitration 
agreement.19 Further, § 4 provides a coercive measure, allowing 
courts to compel arbitration on behalf of any party “aggrieved” by 
its opponent’s refusal to arbitrate.20  
Overall, the FAA embodies “a broad [c]ongressional 
expression of social policy and, in a barebones statute, a 
delegation of decisionmaking responsibility to the judiciary.”21 As 
such, courts play an essential role in “policing” the arbitral 
process, safeguarding the key benefits that arbitration provides 
and which parties expect to derive.22 This often entails ensuring 
that arbitral proceedings are initiated expediently and 
                                                                                                     
 15. See id. at 165–66 (explaining the difference between “pre-dispute” and 
“post-dispute” arbitration agreements). Although post-dispute arbitration 
agreements are possible, “the substantial majority of arbitration proceedings 
arise out of pre-dispute agreements” and, as such, are the sole focus of this Note. 
Id. at 165. 
 16. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2011) (“Validity, irrevocability, and enforcement of 
agreements to arbitrate.”).  
 17. Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2776 (2010) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted).  
 18. See id. (describing how, procedurally, FAA §§ 3 and 4 “implement § 2’s 
substantive rule”).  
 19. See 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2011) (stating that if a party files suit in court, the 
court “shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until 
arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement”). 
 20. See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2011) (stating that, upon the application of a party to 
a valid arbitration agreement, “the court shall make an order directing the 
parties to proceed to arbitration”). 
 21. Alan Scott Rau, Federal Common Law and Arbitral Power, 8 NEV. L.J. 
169, 200 (2007).  
 22. See Bermann, supra note 10, at 2. 
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efficaciously, as challenges to the process frequently arise at the 
outset of a dispute.23 Unfortunately, the procedural tools provided 
in FAA §§ 3 and 4 to assist the courts in fulfilling their role are 
simply that—procedural.24 Neither section denotes the 
appropriate circumstances in which a stay of litigation, or an 
order compelling arbitration, should be granted.25 Thus, devoid of 
statutory directives, courts have struggled to maintain juridical 
clarity in confronting complex issues which arise at the outset of 
disputes—in the grey area between litigation and arbitration.26 
One such issue has caused a significant split among the 
Circuit Courts of Appeals. Particularly, courts have struggled to 
discern whether a party resisting arbitration must show 
prejudice in order to prove that its opponent waived its right to 
arbitrate by engaging in pretrial conduct.27 A majority of circuits 
                                                                                                     
 23. See id. (describing how one way in which courts fulfill their policing role 
is to ensure that “arbitral proceedings are initiated and pursued in a timely and 
effective manner,” as “courts are commonly asked . . . to intervene at the very 
outset” of a dispute).  
 24. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 3–4 (2011) (governing stays of litigation pending 
arbitration and motions to compel arbitration).  
 25. See Bermann, supra note 10, at 3 n.5 (noting that neither § 3 nor § 4 
“addresses the issues that may specifically be raised” in order to secure an order 
to stay, or compel, arbitration under those sections).  
 26. See id. at 4 (stating that, in addressing issues which arise at the outset 
of disputes, courts have developed “disparate strands of analysis” which “have 
combined to produce a needlessly confusing case law to the detriment of clarity, 
coherence, and workability”); Steven H. Reisberg, The Rules Governing Who 
Decides Jurisdictional Issues: First Options v. Kaplan Revisited, 20 AM. REV. 
INT’L ARB. 159, 159 (2009) (discussing the “significant confusion as to how a court 
is to decide which forum, the court or the arbitrator, has the jurisdiction to 
decide [a] threshold issue”).  
 27. See The Federal Arbitration Act—Waiver, APPELLATE.NET (Feb. 22, 
2011), http://www.appellate.net/docketreports/html/2010/docketreport_22Feb11. 
asp#Case1 (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) [hereinafter FAA Waiver] (stating the 
issue as whether “a party opposing arbitration must demonstrate that it was 
prejudiced by the other party’s conduct in order to show that that party had 
waived its right to compel arbitration”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Stok & Assocs., P.A. v. 
Citibank, N.A., No. 10-514 (11th Cir. 2010) (framing the issue as whether “a 
party [should] be required to demonstrate prejudice after the opposing party 
waived its contractual right to arbitrate by participating in litigation”); see also 
Born, supra note 5 (describing the issue as whether “prejudice on the part of a 
resisting party is necessary for an opposing party’s right to compel arbitration to 
be deemed waived”). 
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do require a showing of prejudice, albeit at varying degrees.28 
Conversely, the minority does not require prejudice, but holds a 
presumption of waiver which may be rebutted in certain 
circumstances.29 
The circuit split recently prompted the Supreme Court to 
grant certiorari in order to resolve the matter in Stock & 
Associates, P.A. v. Citibank, N.A.30 Although the parties settled 
their dispute before the Court ruled on the merits,31 its decision 
would have had a momentous impact on the business community 
and the arbitral process itself. Indeed, the issue is “of great 
interest to any business that makes use of arbitration 
agreements,” as the grounds invoked to resist arbitration often 
include waiver “through preliminary litigation conduct.”32 The 
Court’s decision, as described by one practicing arbitration 
attorney, would have “affect[ed] how quickly (or not) parties must 
determine whether arbitration clauses apply to their case and 
when arbitration rights must be asserted.”33 In other words, the 
                                                                                                     
 28. See, e.g., Lewallen v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 487 F.3d 1085, 1090 
(8th Cir. 2007) (utilizing a three-pronged test for waiver which, in part, requires 
prejudice); Rankin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 336 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 2003) (noting that 
a “modicum of prejudice” is necessary to find waiver); Sovak v. Chugai Pharm. 
Co., 280 F.3d 1266, 1270 (9th Cir. 2002) (utilizing a three-pronged test for 
waiver which, in part, requires a showing of prejudice); Ivax Corp. v. B. Braun of 
Am., Inc., 286 F.3d 1309, 1315–16 (11th Cir. 2002) (requiring that one party 
somehow prejudice an opposing party in order to find waiver); Coca-Cola 
Bottling Co. of N.Y. v. Soft Drink & Brewery Workers Union Local 812, 242 F.3d 
52, 57 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating that proof of prejudice is necessary to find waiver); 
MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Lauricia, 268 F.3d 244, 249 (4th Cir. 2001) (requiring 
“actual prejudice” to find waiver); Walker v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 938 F.2d 575, 
577 (5th Cir. 1991) (requiring an invocation of the judicial process by one party 
which prejudices the other party).  
 29. See, e.g., Cabinetree of Wis., Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 
388, 390 (7th Cir. 1995) ([W]e have deemed an election to proceed in court a 
waiver of a contractual right to arbitrate, without insisting on evidence of 
prejudice . . . .”); Nat’l Found. for Cancer Research v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 
821 F.2d 772, 777 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“This circuit has never included prejudice as 
a separate . . . element of the showing necessary to demonstrate waiver of the 
right to arbitration.”). 
 30. See Stok & Assocs., P.A. v. Citibank, N.A., 387 F. App’x 921 (11th Cir. 
2011), cert. granted, 79 U.S.L.W. 3254 (U.S. Feb. 22, 2011) (No. 10-514).  
 31. See Stok & Assocs., P.A. v. Citibank, N.A., 387 F. App’x 921 (11th Cir. 
2011), cert. dismissed, 79 U.S.L.W. 3686 (U.S. June 2, 2011) (No. 10-514). 
 32. FAA Waiver, supra note 27.  
 33. American Arbitration Association, Supreme Court Agrees to Hear 
1616 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1609 (2012) 
opinion would have “provide[d] an analytical framework that 
parties and courts [could] apply to a broad range of arbitration 
issues that arise.”34 Given the importance of this issue, 
commentators predict that the Court will address the matter in 
the near future.35 In the meantime, this Note attempts to fill the 
doctrinal void recognized by the Supreme Court, and assuage the 
juridical strife by developing its own analytical framework to 
supplant the waiver doctrine. 
This Note’s analysis of the waiver doctrine proceeds as 
follows: Part II of this Note discusses the key contractual benefits 
which attract parties to arbitration. Particularly, it discusses how 
arbitration agreements, as forum-selection and procedural-
mapping devices, stabilize and optimize parties’ contractual 
relationships.36 Further, Part II analyzes the Supreme Court’s 
FAA jurisprudence and concludes that contract law should govern 
the waiver by conduct analysis.37 Part III provides an overview of 
the circuit split surrounding waiver doctrine. Particular attention 
is paid to the prejudice requirement and the discrepancies it 
perpetuates among the circuits.38 Part IV provides the 
contractual background for the proposal advanced by this Note. It 
draws the distinction between waiver as defined by contract law, 
and waiver as applied by the Circuit Courts of Appeals in the 
arbitral context. It concludes that, in light of the Supreme Court’s 
recent FAA jurisprudence, a party cannot “waive” its right to 
arbitrate.39 Therefore, it posits that an entirely new framework is 
required. 
                                                                                                     
“Waiver of Arbitration” Case, 66 DISP. RESOL. J. 4, 21 (2011). 
 34. Id.  
 35. See Born, supra note 5 (“Now that the case has been dismissed, it 
seems likely that the Supreme Court will grant certiorari the next time it finds 
itself presented with an appropriate opportunity to address this issue.”). 
 36. See infra Part II (discussing the contractual benefits provided by 
arbitration).  
 37. See infra Part II (discussing how, under the severability doctrine, 
waiver is a gateway issue which must be resolved in accordance with contract 
law).  
 38. See infra Part III (describing the circuit split and discussing the 
divergence engendered by the prejudice requirement).  
 39. See infra Part IV (concluding that a party cannot, in accordance with 
contract law, waive its right to arbitrate).  
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Finally, Part V proposes a comprehensive contractual 
solution through a succinct judicial framework in order to discern 
whether a party has lost its right to arbitrate through pretrial 
conduct. Part V first proposes that the discharge-of-duty 
doctrine40 is the appropriate contract-law defense for a party 
responding to excessive pretrial conduct.41 Next, Part V proposes 
that courts should read an implied term into all arbitration 
agreements. This term would require that parties demand 
arbitration within a reasonable time after one party files a claim 
in court.42 In order to discern what constitutes a reasonable time, 
this Note proposes the adoption of a reasonableness test, 
comprised of the four-factor framework promulgated by the New 
York courts. These courts consider “the nature and object of the 
contract, the previous conduct of the parties, the presence or 
absence of good faith, . . . and the possibility of prejudice or 
hardship” to either party.43 Part V concludes with a hypothetical 
illustrating the efficacy of the reasonableness test both 
doctrinally and from a policy perspective. 
II. Arbitration: Objectives and Law 
A. The Contractual Benefits of Arbitration: Forum and 
Procedural Freedom  
Before discussing the current legal doctrine surrounding 
arbitration in the United States, it is crucial to consider what 
attracts parties to arbitration. What core benefits do parties 
derive through bargained-for arbitral procedures? In what 
                                                                                                     
 40. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 225(2) (1981) (“Unless it 
has been excused, the non-occurrence of a condition discharges the duty when 
the condition can no longer occur.”).  
 41. See Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (stating 
that arbitration agreements may only be invalidated by “generally applicable 
contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability”).   
 42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 (1981) (“When the parties 
to a bargain . . . have not agreed with respect to a term which is essential to a 
determination of their rights and duties, a term which is reasonable in the 
circumstances is supplied by the court.” (emphasis added)).  
 43. Zev v. Merman, 533 N.E.2d 669, 669 (N.Y. 1988). 
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circumstances does arbitration present a more appealing 
adjudicatory forum than litigation? 
As a starting point, arbitration agreements are “in effect, a 
specialized kind of forum-selection clause.”44 Parties who bargain 
for arbitration essentially contract for the choice between two 
legal regimes—litigation and arbitration.45 Comparatively, 
parties might choose one forum over the other for any number of 
reasons. For example, arbitration may be more expedient, cost 
effective, and pose fewer risks of “aberrational” jury awards.46 In 
other circumstances, parties might desire the full panoply of 
procedural protections and appellate review processes offered by 
the judicial system.47 Particularly, high stakes disputes or issues 
concerning clearly delineated legal principles may prompt 
recourse to a judicial, rather than an arbitral forum.48 In any 
event, arbitration provides a judicially accepted49 alternative 
“structure,” or “basic set of parameters within which people are 
free to” resolve their disputes.50 
Additionally, parties acting within this alternative structure 
have the ability to establish procedures by which their disputes 
will be resolved.51 To be sure, parties could opt to include a 
                                                                                                     
 44. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974); see Christopher 
R. Drahozal & Peter B. Rutledge, Contract and Procedure, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 
1103, 1105 (2011) (stating that arbitration clauses are essentially “contractual 
forum selection devices”).  
 45. See Keith N. Hylton, Arbitration: Governance Benefits and Enforcement 
Costs, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 489, 490 (2005) (stating that “parties who can 
choose to submit their disputes to arbitration . . . have a choice between two 
legal regimes,” litigation and arbitration). 
 46. See Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses 
Use (or Not Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 433, 451 
(2010) (stating that “arbitration may be faster and cheaper than 
litigation, . . . may lessen the risk of punitive damages awards or aberrational 
jury verdicts[,] . . . [and] may decrease exposure to class actions”). 
 47. See id. at 453 (discussing the circumstances in which parties might 
choose to resolve their disputes through litigation rather than arbitration).  
 48. See id. at 436 (stating that parties may prefer litigation to arbitration 
in “high stakes disputes” and “disputes in areas with clear and well developed 
law,” as the “industry expertise” of arbitrators is less valuable in such cases). 
 49. See Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 44, at 1105 (stating that “[c]ourts 
[have] largely accepted” arbitration clauses as forum-selection devices, subject 
only “to a narrow range of exceptions”). 
 50. See Hylton, supra note 45, at 489.  
 51. See Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 44, at 1105 (noting that parties to 
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forum-selection clause in their contract to site potential disputes 
in a court with favorable procedural rules.52 Once invoked, 
however, most rules of civil procedure provide little, if any, 
opportunity to restrict their application.53 Stated differently, “a 
party might pick from among several restaurants but could not 
control what would be on the menu.”54  
By contrast, “arbitration clauses have a more profound effect 
on the procedure by which disputes are resolved.”55 In some cases, 
they incorporate the rules of arbitral institutions by reference,56 
which act as “mini-codes of civil procedure.”57 These codes, 
however, merely provide default rules which give way in the 
wake of express terms in the parties’ arbitration agreement.58 In 
other instances, parties construct their own arbitral framework, 
negotiating procedural rules in lieu of those offered by arbitral 
institutions.59 In either case, however, parties may select any 
number of procedural measures, including restrictions on 
discovery, remedies, and limitations periods,60 subject only to due 
                                                                                                     
arbitration agreements have the ability to bargain “over procedural rights even 
before a dispute arises”). 
 52. See id. at 1114 (describing the operative purpose of forum-selection 
clauses). 
 53. See id. (noting that once the litigation forum is “fixed 
contractually . . . most rules of civil procedure limit[] the parties’ ability to 
contract around its provisions”). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id.  
 56. See id. at 1106 (stating that arbitration agreements “may incorporate 
by reference the rules of arbitral institutions”).  
 57. Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 597 
(2005). 
 58. See AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 
RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES 20 (2009) [hereinafter AAA RULES] (“The 
parties, by written agreement, may vary the procedures set forth in these 
rules.”); Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 44, at 1106 (stating that the rules of 
arbitral institutions “can be overridden by the express terms of the parties’ 
arbitration agreement”).  
 59. See Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 44, at 1106 (noting that 
procedural rules may be “explicit terms of the parties’ contract, decoupled from 
the rules of an administering institution”).  
 60. See id. at 1107 (stating that examples of potential arbitral procedures 
include “limits on the availability of discovery, contractually imposed limitations 
periods, . . . [and] limitations on remedies”).  
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process concerns.61 Thus, arbitration clauses serve as both forum-
selection devices and “procedural contracts” in which parties 
construct dispute resolution mechanisms that best support their 
contractual arrangements.62  
Ultimately, parties spend substantial resources establishing 
arbitral procedures, in lieu of the no-cost regime provided by the 
judicial system, to optimize the “processes and outcomes” 
surrounding their disputes.63 Indeed, “[a]rbitration provides an 
alternative forum in which parties can structure rules and 
enforcement methods so that the difference between governance 
benefits and enforcement costs is larger than in the default 
regime represented by ordinary courts.”64 Governance benefits 
encompass the costs saved by having rules which limit the level 
of risk that one party can impose on the other (i.e., a rule against 
breaching the contract).65 Conversely, enforcement costs include 
the costs of both writing the rules and arbitrating to enforce the 
rules which govern the contractual relationship in question.66 
After engaging in this cost–benefit analysis,67 rational parties 
will adopt procedural rules that they expect “will provide them 
with a better process than litigation,” better “outcomes than 
litigation, or both.”68 At its core, then, arbitration provides 
                                                                                                     
 61. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2011) (providing limited grounds, rooted in due 
process concerns, upon which a party may seek to modify or vacate an arbitral 
award); AAA RULES, supra note 58, at 32 (“[E]ach party has the right to be 
heard and . . . given a fair opportunity to present its case.”). 
 62. Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 44, at 1106. 
 63. Drahozal & Ware, supra note 46, at 451.  
 64. Hylton, supra note 45, at 493. 
 65. See id. at 491 (describing governance benefits as “[a]ny set of rules 
governing interaction among private parties” which will “provide a benefit for 
which the parties are willing to pay,” such as rules which “govern the amount of 
risk that one can impose on others”).  
 66. See id. (stating that enforcement costs include the costs of both writing 
and enforcing “the rules governing private interaction”).  
 67. See id. at 492 (noting that parties “will waive a legal rule whenever the 
governance benefit from the rule is less than the enforcement cost”); 
Christopher R. Drahozal, Contracting Out of National Law: An Empirical Look 
at the New Law Merchant, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 523, 531–32 (2005) 
[hereinafter Drahozal, Contracting Out] (stating that, in choosing an 
adjudicatory forum, parties consider whether “the process costs of arbitration” 
are “higher or lower than the process costs of litigation”). 
 68. Drahozal & Ware, supra note 46, at 451. 
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stability. It allows parties to mitigate risks and costs appurtenant 
to their contractual relationships by extending predictability to 
the dispute resolution process.69 Thus, adequately enforced, post 
hoc arbitral procedures optimize the very contractual 
arrangements which impel their existence.70 The key, however, is 
adequate enforcement.71 Therefore, the current FAA 
jurisprudence aims to preserve the stability derived through 
bargained-for arbitral procedures by protecting parties’ legitimate 
expectations.72 
                                                                                                     
 69. See Antony W. Dnes, Franchise Contracts, Opportunism and the 
Quality of Law, 3 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 257, 259 (2009) (noting that 
“private enforcement mechanisms,” such as arbitration, are “a means to 
stabilize contracts within a foreseeable range of variation of market conditions”); 
Christopher R. Drahozal & Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Litigation and 
Arbitration: An Application to Franchise Contracts, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 549, 550 
(2003) (stating that predispute arbitration agreements are “designed to 
minimize the costs of [contracting parties’] relationship[s]”); Hylton, supra note 
45, at 491 (stating that “[a] rule against breaching contracts, if complied with 
perfectly, provides an ex ante benefit” to the parties’ contractual relationship); 
Amy J. Schmitz, Consideration of “Contracting Culture” in Enforcing Arbitration 
Provisions, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 123, 153 (2007) (“Prior dealings, personal 
relationships, and concern for maintaining good business reputations may 
compel players within a business community to comply with their contracts, or 
resolve disputes without the aid of the courts . . . . because private dispute 
resolution often solves far more problems than rigid litigation . . . .”); Thomas J. 
Stipanowich, Contract and Conflict Management, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 831, 831–32 
(stating that, through arbitration, lawyers have the opportunity to “limit or 
manage problems prospectively” by negotiating and drafting “suitable issue and 
conflict resolution mechanisms for contractual relationships” which “assur[e] 
control and reduc[e] uncertainty and risk”). 
 70. See Drahozal, Contracting Out, supra note 67, at 532–33 (finding that 
predispute choice of law provisions in contracts, “like the choice between 
arbitration and litigation,” lend certainty to parties’ contractual relationships 
which provides for adequate pricing of contract rights and duties and decreases 
the costs and frequency of litigation); Drahozal & Hylton, supra note 69, at 580, 
582 (finding that parties bargain for arbitral procedures when that forum 
“provides the optimal level of deterrence against undesirable conduct,” thus 
increasing governance benefits and “the quality of output and level of effort” in 
parties’ contractual relationships); Hylton, supra note 45, at 500 (finding that 
because arbitration agreements “enhance governance benefits,” they promote 
“organizations working more effectively on a day-to-day basis”). 
 71. See Bermann, supra note 10, at 2 (noting that courts play an 
“important policing role” in assuring “that arbitration delivers the various 
advantages associated with it”).  
 72. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) 
(“Arbitration is a matter of contract, and the FAA requires courts to honor 
parties’ expectations.”); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 
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B. Arbitration Doctrine: The Supreme Court’s Interpretation 
of the FAA 
Because the benefits derived from arbitration are, in essence, 
contractual, it is appropriate that the FAA protects arbitration 
agreements as contracts.73 The Supreme Court, however, has not 
always interpreted the FAA in a manner so conducive to parties’ 
arbitral rights. Thus, a brief historical note will better frame the 
importance and implications of the Supreme Court’s current FAA 
jurisprudence. 
1. Early Twentieth Century Arbitration: Pre- and Post-FAA 
Prior to the FAA, opportunities to bargain for arbitral 
procedures were severely constricted.74 Considered nothing more 
than tools of oppression,75 courts generally nullified arbitration 
agreements and assumed jurisdiction over the matter in 
question.76 In 1925, however, Congress moved to quell the 
“judicial hostility” toward arbitration agreements by enacting the 
FAA.77 
The FAA’s stated purpose is to place arbitration agreements 
“upon the same footing as other contracts.”78 It “declares simply 
that . . . agreements for arbitration shall be enforced, and 
                                                                                                     
1758, 1773–74 (2010) (“Whether enforcing an agreement to arbitrate or 
construing an arbitration clause, courts and arbitrators must give effect to the 
contractual rights and expectations of the parties.” (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted)). 
 73. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2011) (mandating the protection of arbitration 
agreements as contracts). 
 74. See Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 44, at 1112 (noting how 
“opportunities to control procedure” through arbitration clauses “were largely 
non-existent” prior to the FAA). 
 75. Parsons v. Ambos, 48 S.E. 696, 697 (Ga. 1904) (stating that arbitration 
agreements are used merely as tools to “oppress the weak”).  
 76. See W.H. Blodgett Co. v. Bebe Co., 214 P. 38, 40 (Cal. 1923) (stating 
that courts could simply “disregard [arbitration] agreements, assume 
jurisdiction, and determine the matters in dispute”); see also Parsons, 48 S.E. at 
697 (finding that arbitration clauses “may be revoked by either party at any 
time before the award”); Cocalis v. Nazlides, 139 N.E. 95, 98 (Ill. 1923) (holding 
arbitration clauses “void”). 
 77. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011).  
 78. H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924). 
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provides a procedure in the federal courts for their 
enforcement.”79 Despite this seemingly clear mandate, however, 
skepticism surrounding arbitrators’ motives and juridical 
prowess remained.80 As such, federal courts continued to hold 
certain claims nonarbitrable, including alleged violations of 
federal securities81 and antitrust laws.82 As a result, claims 
arising under those laws remained in court, where the ability to 
bargain for optimal procedures remained limited.83 Gradually, 
however, federal courts’ distrust of arbitration subsided. 
Beginning with Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin 
Manufacturing Co.84 in 1967, the Supreme Court became 
increasingly willing to enforce arbitration agreements.85 Indeed, 
the Prima Paint Court devised one of the most doctrinally 
significant concepts in U.S. arbitration law to date—the 
severability doctrine.86 It essentially “permits courts to entertain 
challenges specifically applicable to the arbitration agreement, 
and not to the contract as a whole.”87 The Court devised the 
                                                                                                     
 79. Id. at 1–2. 
 80. See Peter B. Rutledge, Whither Arbitration?, 6 GEO J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
549, 553 (2008) (noting that “courts showed greater tolerance” for arbitration 
agreements after Congress passed the FAA, but that “there were still limits” to 
that tolerance).  
 81. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953) (refusing to allow the 
arbitration of federal securities claims because arbitral awards “may be made 
without explanation,” without a “record of their proceedings,” and “arbitrators’ 
conception of the legal meaning” of certain statutory requirements “cannot be 
examined”). 
 82. See Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 827–
28 (2d Cir. 1968) (finding that antitrust cases should be resolved in court given 
their complexity and the fact that antitrust laws regulate the business 
community in which many arbitrators are a part). 
 83. See Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 44, at 1112–13 (discussing how, 
under the “nonarbitrability doctrine,” claims which remained in federal court 
were subject to limited “opportunities to influence procedure by contract”).  
 84. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 
(1967) (recognizing arbitration clauses as separate, binding contracts). 
 85. See Christopher R. Drahozal, “Unfair” Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 695, 702 (stating that “the Supreme Court’s decisions became more 
favorable to arbitration” beginning with Prima Paint in 1967). 
 86. See Bermann, supra note 10, at 24 (finding the severability doctrine 
“well-entrenched” in U.S. arbitration law).  
 87. Id. at 23; see Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 403–04 (holding that if a claim is 
directed at “the arbitration clause itself . . . the federal court may proceed to 
adjudicate it,” but that claims directed at “the contract generally” must be 
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doctrine in accordance with the FAA’s mandate to limit judicial 
obstruction and facilitate expedient access to the arbitral forum.88 
After Prima Paint, parties’ rights to bargain for arbitral 
procedures continued to expand throughout the 1970s and 1980s 
in two critical ways.89 First, the nonarbitrability doctrine 
dissipated,90 as the Supreme Court held federal securities claims, 
RICO claims,91 and antitrust claims arbitrable.92 Second, the 
Court interpreted FAA § 2 as declaring a national federal policy 
favoring arbitration, thus withdrawing states’ power to declare 
certain claims nonarbitrable.93 In effect, state authority was 
supplanted by the “federal substantive law of arbitrability.”94 
This body of law requires that “doubts concerning the scope of 
arbitrable issues” be resolved in favor of arbitration, including 
those regarding “the construction of the contract language itself 
or . . . allegation[s] of waiver, delay, or a like defense to 
arbitrability.”95 The Supreme Court thus came to embrace 
freedom of contract principles in the arbitral context, creating 
greater potential for parties to regulate the forum and procedures 
by which to resolve their disputes.96 
                                                                                                     
referred to the tribunal). 
 88. See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 404 (formulating the severability doctrine 
in order to “honor . . . the unmistakably clear congressional purpose that” 
arbitration “be speedy and not subject to delay and obstruction by the courts”).  
 89. See Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 44, at 1113 (noting that 
throughout the “1970s and 1980s,” the “opportunities to control procedure by 
contract expanded”).  
 90. See id. (noting that “as the nonarbitrability doctrine crumbled,” parties 
“had an incentive . . . to use their new contractual freedom” to establish 
appropriate procedures). 
 91. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1987) 
(finding agreements to arbitrate both Securities Exchange Act claims and RICO 
claims enforceable under the FAA). 
 92. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 
640 (1985) (finding antitrust claims arbitrable under the FAA). 
 93. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (“In enacting § 2 
of the [FAA], Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and 
withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of 
claims which . . . contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.”). 
 94. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 
(1983). 
 95. Id. at 24–25. 
 96. See Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 44, at 1114 (noting that the 
Supreme Court’s acceptance of “freedom of contract” raised a “newfound 
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2. Current Arbitration Doctrine: Enforcing Arbitration 
Agreements as Contracts 
Judicial acceptance of arbitration agreements continues to 
expand today.97 For example, in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. 
AnimalFeeds International Corp.,98 the Supreme Court found 
that a party cannot be forced to submit to class arbitration unless 
“there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed 
to do so.”99 Similarly, in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. 
Kaplan,100 the Court found that parties can empower tribunals to 
determine whether they have jurisdiction over certain disputes.101 
Thus, courts will defer to an arbitrator’s decision regarding its 
own jurisdiction if the parties agreed to confer such power.102 If 
the parties did not confer such power, then the courts will 
decide.103 Indeed, one of the only contractual measures 
invalidated by the Supreme Court involved an attempt to expand 
the grounds on which to vacate an arbitral award under the 
FAA.104 The Court’s aim, however, was to limit post-proceeding 
contractual freedoms in order “to maintain arbitration’s essential 
virtue of resolving disputes straightaway.”105 Thus, the Court 
                                                                                                     
opportunity to control procedure by contract”).  
 97. See id. at 1165 (stating that “[t]he greater judicial solicitude [toward 
arbitration] that took root in the early 1970s . . . fully blossomed by the late 
1980s” and continues to grow).  
 98. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775 
(2010) (finding that contracting parties must explicitly agree to allow class 
arbitration). 
 99. Id.  
 100. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995) 
(finding that parties may empower arbitrators to determine their own 
jurisdiction over certain disputes). 
 101. See id. 
 102. See id. (finding that “court[s] should give considerable leeway to the 
arbitrator” to determine its own jurisdiction if the parties agreed to confer such 
power). 
 103. See id. (“If . . . the parties did not agree to submit the arbitrability 
question itself to arbitration, then the court should decide that 
question . . . independently.” (emphasis in original)). 
 104. Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 583 (2008) (finding 
that the FAA provides the exclusive grounds for vacating and modifying arbitral 
awards). 
 105. Id. at 588. 
1626 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1609 (2012) 
sought to uphold the national policy favoring arbitration by 
preserving the key benefits that arbitration provides both before 
and during arbitral proceedings.106 
Recently, the FAA’s limits on contractual freedom were 
tested yet again in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.107 In 
Concepcion, the issue was whether state laws which held class-
arbitration waivers per se unconscionable conflicted with the 
FAA.108 Answering in the affirmative, the Court stated that 
although the FAA “preserves generally applicable contract 
defenses,” it does not protect state laws which “stand as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment of [its] objectives.”109 Thus, 
although California’s Discover Bank rule sowed its roots in 
unconscionability, a generally applicable contract defense, it was 
nonetheless preempted for its “disproportionate” application to 
arbitration agreements.110 
In arriving at its conclusion, the Court declared its latest 
interpretation of the FAA’s core objectives. It stated that the 
“overarching purpose of the FAA . . . is to ensure the enforcement 
of arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to 
facilitate streamlined proceedings.”111 The two goals inherent 
within this objective—enforcement of arbitration agreements and 
facilitation of expedient dispute resolution—should neither 
conflict nor rank in importance. 112 Rather, the Court alluded to 
                                                                                                     
 106. See id. at 583 (viewing FAA §§ 9–11 “as substantiating a national policy 
favoring arbitration with just the limited review needed to maintain 
arbitration’s” expediency).  
 107. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) 
(finding a state law that held class arbitration waivers unconscionable 
preempted by the FAA, as it stood “as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress” (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted)). 
 108. See id. at 1744 (considering “whether the FAA prohibits [s]tates from 
conditioning the enforceability of certain arbitration agreements on the 
availability of classwide arbitration procedures”).  
 109. Id. at 1748.  
 110. Id. at 1747, 1753.  
 111. Id. at 1748. 
 112. See id. at 1749 (describing the FAA’s two underlying goals as 
“enforcement of private agreements and encouragement of efficient and speedy 
dispute resolution” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).  
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the possibility that an optimal rule would further both objectives 
in unison.113  
But what role do courts play in enforcing the FAA’s 
overarching objective in relation to arbitrators? How is it that 
courts retain jurisdiction to decide certain disputes, but not 
others? Over which disputes do courts retain jurisdiction? The 
answer to these inquiries is governed by one of the most 
important doctrinal concepts in U.S. arbitration law—
severability.114 
3. Severability: A “Gateway” to Arbitration 
The severability doctrine115 has become firmly ensconced in 
substantive federal arbitration law116 and performs two key 
functions.117 First, derived from FAA § 4,118 it reflects the 
fundamental principle that arbitrators derive their authority 
through party consent.119 In this regard, severability insulates 
                                                                                                     
 113. See id. (noting explicitly that “[i]n the present case . . . those ‘two goals’ 
do not conflict—and it is the dissent’s view that would frustrate both of them” 
(emphasis in original)). 
 114. See Bermann, supra note 10, at 22 (stating that severability “serves a 
highly salutary purpose” in arbitration law, in that it upholds “[p]arty 
expectations”).  
 115. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (describing the severability 
doctrine). 
 116. See Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc., v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2774 (2010) 
(noting that arbitration agreements are “severable from the remainder” of the 
underlying contract); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 
445 (2006) (“[A]s a matter of substantive federal arbitration law, an arbitration 
provision is severable from the remainder of the contract.”); Prima Paint Corp. 
v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403 (1967) (promulgating the concept 
that arbitration clauses are severable from the remainder of the underlying 
agreement); Bermann, supra note 10, at 24 (noting that the severability doctrine 
is “well-entrenched in the case law”). 
 117. See Bermann, supra note 10, at 23 (finding that severability in U.S. 
arbitration law performs “twin functions”). 
 118. See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2011) (providing parties the ability to petition a 
federal court to compel arbitration); Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 403 (finding that 
the severability doctrine has its roots in FAA § 4, which requires federal courts 
to compel arbitration “once it is satisfied that the making of the agreement for 
arbitration . . . is not in issue” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).  
 119. See AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648–
49 (1986) (finding the notion that arbitration requires consent an “axiom” which 
“recognizes the fact that arbitrators derive their authority to resolve disputes 
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the arbitral process from challenges directed toward the 
underlying contract, preserving the forum in which the parties 
agreed to resolve their disputes.120 In effect, the doctrine ensures 
that parties’ disputes are resolved according to their legitimate 
expectations, thus maintaining arbitration’s stabilizing effect.121  
Second, severability “permits courts to entertain challenges 
specifically applicable to the arbitration agreement, [but] not to 
the contract as a whole.”122 This function implicates the critical 
“demarcation between gateway and non-gateway issues.”123 
Indeed, some of the issues most salient to the “tradeoff between 
[the] efficacy and legitimacy” of the arbitral process occur at the 
outset of a dispute, before the tribunal is constituted.124 The 
critical inquiry at this stage is whether a party is contractually 
obligated to arbitrate, notwithstanding its objections to the 
contrary.125 The answer requires a delicate balancing between 
arbitration’s consensual foundation and the costs and delays 
appurtenant to ensuring such consent.126 Gateway issues thus 
                                                                                                     
only because the parties have agreed in advance to submit such grievances to 
arbitration”); Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 414 U.S. 368, 
374 (1974) (“The law compels a party to submit his grievance to arbitration only 
if he has contracted to do so.”); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf 
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960) (“For arbitration is a matter of contract 
and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he 
has not agreed so to submit.”). 
 120. See Bermann, supra note 10, at 22 (One purpose [of severability] . . . is 
to enable an arbitral tribunal to declare a contract invalid or unenforceable on 
the merits, without thereby necessarily destroying the basis of its authority to 
make that very ruling.”). 
 121. See id. (“Party expectations concerning arbitration would clearly be 
disserved if arbitral tribunals were deemed, by virtue of deciding that a contract 
is invalid, to deprive themselves of the legal authority to make that very 
decision.”). 
 122. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403–
04 (1967) (instructing federal courts to “order arbitration to proceed once it is 
satisfied that ‘the making of the agreement for arbitration . . . is not in issue’”); 
Berman, supra note 10, at 23.  
 123. See Bermann, supra note 10, at 22. 
 124. Id. at 5.  
 125. See id. (noting that the critical question at the outset of a dispute “is 
whether a party unwilling to arbitrate is obligated, on the basis of a prior 
undertaking, to do so”). 
 126. See id. (“[A] party cannot be bound by an agreement to 
arbitrate . . . unless it consented to be so bound. On the other hand, arbitration 
becomes a less effective means of dispute resolution to the extent that, prior to 
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encompass those “jurisdictional or threshold” issues, grounded in 
consent, which courts will resolve rather than leave for the 
tribunal.127 By contrast, non-gateway issues, such as substantive 
claims arising from the parties’ underlying contract, are for 
tribunals to decide.128 In this regard, severability acts as a 
“jurisdiction-allocating device” between challenges directed 
toward the underlying contract, and those directed toward the 
arbitration clause itself.129 The former are non-gateway issues, as 
they encompass the very contractual issues which parties agree 
to arbitrate.130 The latter, however, are gateway issues because 
they directly implicate “the tribunal’s authority to decide 
anything—including the validity and enforceability of the main 
contract.”131 
Ultimately, the role of severability as a gatekeeper to the 
arbitral forum is critical. It remains the guidepost for allocating 
jurisdiction over certain issues between courts and arbitrators at 
the outset of a dispute.132 But once a gateway issue has been 
raised, how does severability impact a court’s decision to uphold, 
or deny, parties’ arbitral rights?  
                                                                                                     
arbitration, parties may have recourse to courts to advance reasons why 
arbitration should not go forward . . . .”). 
 127. See id. at 7. Professor Bermann notes that although the term “gateway 
issue” has been read broadly by the Supreme Court to encompass a variety of 
jurisdictional issues, the Court’s most recent interpretation, and the one 
adopted by both Professor Bermann and this Note, subscribe to the narrower 
meaning described above. Id. at 7–8. See also Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc., v. Jackson, 
130 S. Ct. 2772, 2777 (2010) (“[P]arties can agree to arbitrate ‘gateway’ 
questions of ‘arbitrability,’ such as whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate 
or whether their agreement covers a particular controversy.”). 
 128. See Bermann, supra note 10, at 8 (describing non-gateway issues as 
“those that courts reserve for initial determination, along with the merits, to the 
tribunal itself”). 
 129. Id. at 24.  
 130. See id. at 23 (“The question whether a contract on which a claim in 
arbitration is predicated exists and is valid . . . clearly forms part of the merits 
of a case, and as such falls . . . within the arbitrators’ province to resolve.”).  
 131. Id. 
 132. See id. at 24 (noting that severability is “the touchstone for determining 
whether courts should initially entertain challenges to the enforceability of an 
arbitration agreement or refrain from doing so”). 
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4. The Impact of Severability on Parties’ Arbitral Rights in 
the Courts 
The Supreme Court has solidified the severability doctrine’s 
place in federal arbitration law in three key cases. First, in Prima 
Paint, the Court applied the doctrine in light of a claim that 
because the overall contract was fraudulently induced, the 
arbitration clause within the contract was invalid as well.133 After 
finding that claims for fraud fell within the scope of the parties’ 
arbitration agreement, the Court affirmed the trial court’s 
decision to stay judicial proceedings pending arbitration.134 In 
doing so, it found that FAA § 4 instructs courts to compel 
arbitration if a challenge is not directed toward the arbitration 
clause itself.135 As such, the severability doctrine was conceived. 
Almost forty years after Prima Paint, the Supreme Court 
revisited the severability doctrine136 in Buckeye Check Cashing, 
Inc. v. Cardegna.137 In Buckeye, however, the Florida Supreme 
Court refused to enforce an otherwise valid arbitration agreement 
on grounds that the underlying contract was illegal, rather than 
fraudulent.138 Rejecting this distinction, the Supreme Court found 
that state courts must apply the severability doctrine in the same 
manner as federal courts.139 Further, after Buckeye, the Court 
                                                                                                     
 133. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 
(1967) (finding that the claim in question alleged “fraud in the inducement of 
the contract generally”).  
 134. See id. at 399–400, 406 (finding the language “‘(a)ny controversy or 
claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement’” sufficiently broad to 
encompass Prima Paint’s claim for fraud). 
 135. See id. at 403 (finding that a court must “order arbitration to proceed 
once it is satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration . . . is not in 
issue” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).  
 136. See Steven J. Ware, Arbitration Law’s Separability Doctrine After 
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 8 NEV. L.J. 107, 107 (2008) (noting 
that Buckeye “is only the second Supreme Court decision applying the 
separability doctrine and it comes nearly forty years after” Prima Paint).  
 137. See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 446 (2006) 
(finding claims against an entire agreement under state usury and consumer 
protection laws arbitrable under FAA § 2). 
 138. See id. (noting that the Florida Supreme Court declined “to apply 
Prima Paint’s rule of severability” on grounds that severability cannot apply to 
contracts found illegal or void).  
 139. See id. at 449 (“[R]egardless of whether the challenge is brought in 
federal or state court, a challenge to the validity of the contract as a whole, and 
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made clear that challenges directed toward the underlying 
contract are “irrelevant” for severability purposes.140 Thus, an 
otherwise severable arbitration agreement will be upheld, even if 
claims for fraud, illegality, or breach of contract permeate the 
underlying agreement.141 
Finally, in Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson,142 the 
Supreme Court upheld a provision, as part of a stand-alone 
arbitration agreement, which delegated all disputes arising out of 
the parties’ employment contract to arbitration.143 In doing so, it 
affirmed the notion established in Buckeye, finding that the 
“[a]pplication of the severability rule does not depend on the 
substance of the remainder of the contract.”144 Thus, even if “the 
underlying contract is itself an arbitration agreement,” the 
severability doctrine protects the delegation provision unless 
challenged directly.145 
Ultimately, the severability doctrine protects arbitration 
clauses as binding, autonomous contracts within contracts.146 It 
supplements FAA § 2 in ensuring that arbitration agreements are 
afforded the full spectrum of contract-law protections, regardless 
of any challenges directed toward the underlying contract.147 In 
                                                                                                     
not specifically to the arbitration clause, must go to the arbitrator.”). 
 140. Id. at 446. 
 141. See id. (stating that a valid arbitration agreement will be upheld, 
regardless of whether claims for “fraud, misrepresentation, breach of contract, 
breach of fiduciary duty,” or public policy are directed at the overall contract).  
 142. Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc., v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2781 (2010) (finding 
that an unconscionability claim directed at an autonomous arbitration 
agreement is arbitrable). 
 143. See id. at 2775 (describing the parties’ employment relationship and 
arbitration agreement).  
 144. Id. at 2779. 
 145. Id.  
 146. See Bermann, supra note 10, at 22 (noting that the severability doctrine 
“basically posits that an arbitration agreement constitutes an agreement 
separate and apart from the main contract”); Ware, supra note 136, at 109 
(stating that the severability doctrine treats an “arbitration clause as if it is a 
separate contract from the contract containing the arbitration clause”). 
 147. See Jackson, 130 S. Ct. at 2777–78 (finding that an arbitration 
agreement “is simply an additional, antecedent agreement” which is “valid 
under [FAA] § 2 ‘save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract’” (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2011))); see also AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745–46 (2011) (stating that FAA 
§ 2 reflects “the fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of contract” 
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this regard, the doctrine isolates and magnifies the discrete 
benefits derived through arbitration. These benefits do not stem 
from the parties’ underlying agreement, but from the arbitration 
clause itself—the ex ante stability and predictability which 
promote parties’ contractual arrangements.148 As such, gateway 
issues involving direct challenges to an arbitration agreement 
must be resolved in accordance with contract law149—no more, no 
less.150 In this regard, it is next critical to discern whether waiver 
is a gateway issue to which contract law must apply. 
5. The Origins of the “Waiver” Doctrine in the Arbitral Context: 
Correctly Applied?  
In the arbitral context, waiver refers to whether a party, 
through words or conduct, has somehow lost its right to 
arbitrate.151 Federal courts construe the term waiver from FAA 
§ 3, finding the word “default”152 in that provision analogous “to 
waiver or laches or estoppel.”153 In application, the courts 
distinguish “between contract-based waiver and conduct-based 
                                                                                                     
and, as such, may only be invalidated by “generally applicable contract 
defenses” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 
 148. See supra Part II (discussing the benefits that parties derive from 
arbitration). 
 149. See Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) 
(“[G]enerally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or 
unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without 
contravening [FAA] § 2.”); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987) (“A 
court may not, then, in assessing the rights of litigants to enforce an arbitration 
agreement, construe that agreement in a manner different from that which it 
otherwise construes nonarbitration agreements under state [contract] law.”).  
 150. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 
n.12 (1967) (“As the ‘saving clause’ in [FAA] § 2 indicates, the purpose of 
Congress in 1925 was to make arbitration agreements as enforceable as other 
contracts, but not more so.”). 
 151. See supra Part I (explaining that the concept of waiver which this Note 
addresses is waiver through pretrial conduct, not express waiver).  
 152. See 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2011) (stating that courts must stay litigation pending 
arbitration, provided that the party applying for the stay is “not in default in 
proceeding with such arbitration”). 
 153. In re Mercury Constr. Corp., 656 F.2d 933, 939 (4th Cir. 1981); see 
Morewitz v. W. of Eng. Ship Owners Mut. Prot. and Indem. Ass’n, 62 F.2d 1356, 
1365 n.16 (11th Cir. 1995) (“Although the Arbitration Act uses the term 
‘default’ . . . the case law on this subject employs the term ‘waiver.’”). 
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waiver, holding that the former is for the arbitral tribunal to 
decide, while the latter may be determined at the threshold by a 
court.”154 Contract-based waiver, for example, occurs when a 
party waives its right to arbitrate a certain claim arising out of 
the underlying contract.155 Conduct-based waiver, however, 
occurs when a party waives its right to invoke the arbitration 
agreement by, for example, litigating disputes which the parties 
agreed to arbitrate.156 
The Supreme Court has yet to address conduct-based waiver, 
or to define “default” under FAA § 3. Indeed, the Court’s only 
reference to waiver occurred in the contract-based context—in 
discerning the scope of arbitrable claims.157 Critically, however, 
the Court has found that FAA “§ 3 adds no substantive restriction 
to § 2’s enforceability mandate.”158 Rather, § 2 creates 
                                                                                                     
 154. Bermann, supra note 10, at 42. 
 155. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 7, 
29 (1983) (finding that the question as to whether a party has “lost any right to 
arbitrat[e]” the “underlying contractual dispute” due to “waiver, laches, 
estoppel, [or] failure to make a timely demand for arbitration” is for the 
arbitrator to decide); see also Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452 
(2003) (finding disputes “about what the arbitration contract in each case means 
(i.e., whether it forbids the use of class arbitration procedures) is a dispute 
relating to this [underlying] contract and the resulting ‘relationships’” and is for 
“an arbitrator, not a judge” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); 
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002) (finding that 
“‘procedural questions which grow out of the dispute and bear on its final 
disposition’ are presumptively not for the judge, but for an arbitrator, to decide” 
(emphasis in original) (citations omitted)). 
 156. See, e.g., Grigsby & Assocs., Inc. v. M Sec. Inv., 664 F.3d 1350, 1353 
(11th Cir. 2011) (“It is presumptively for the courts to adjudicate disputes about 
whether a party, by earlier litigating in court, has waived the right to 
arbitrate.”); JPD, Inc. v. Chronimed Holdings, Inc., 539 F.3d 388, 393 (6th Cir. 
2008) (holding that “the court, not the arbitrator, presumptively evaluates 
whether a defendant should be barred from seeking a referral to arbitration 
because it has acted inconsistently with reliance on an arbitration agreement”); 
Ehleiter v. Grapetree Shores, Inc., 482 F.3d 207, 219 (3d Cir. 2007) (finding that 
issues surrounding waiver by pretrial conduct are for the “court to decide 
itself”); Marie v. Allied Home Mortg. Corp., 402 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2005) 
(finding that the Supreme Court “did not intend to disturb the traditional rule 
that waiver by conduct, at least when due to litigation-related activity, is 
presumptively an issue for the court”). 
 157. See Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24 (“The basic issue presented in 
Mercury’s federal suit was the arbitrability of the [underlying] dispute between 
Mercury and the Hospital.”). 
 158. Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896, 1902 (2009) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
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“substantive federal law” which incorporates traditional state 
contract law principles in governing “the enforceability of 
arbitration agreements.”159 Therefore, neither § 3 nor § 4 alter the 
“background principles of state contract law” for determining the 
validity and enforceability of arbitration agreements.160 
Ultimately, the current doctrine illuminates how courts 
should approach the conduct-based waiver analysis. First, 
conduct-based waiver implicates the “obligation to arbitrate, 
rather than the contract’s substantive obligations.”161 Thus, 
although courts and commentators have criticized this 
approach,162 conduct-based waiver is properly considered a 
gateway issue under the severability doctrine.163 Second, FAA § 2 
requires that courts enforce arbitration agreements in accordance 
with generally applicable contract law principles.164 Finally, as 
§ 3 adds no substantive element to § 2’s enforceability mandate, 
waiver, as derived from § 3, must meet the definition of waiver 
prescribed by contract law.165 Before turning to contract law, 
                                                                                                     
 159. Id. at 1901–02. 
 160. Id. at 1902. 
 161. Bermann, supra note 10, at 42.  
 162. See, e.g., Clyde Bergemann, Inc. v. Sullivan, Higgins & Brion, PPE 
LLC, No. 08-162-KI, 2008 WL 4279632, at *1, *1 (D. Or. Sept. 18, 2008) 
(criticizing the notion, in light of prior Supreme Court jurisprudence, that 
waiver of any kind is for the court to decide); Bermann, supra note 10, at 43 
(“More general considerations of efficacy and legitimacy suggest that all claims 
of waiver should be determined initially by the arbitrators.”). Professor 
Bermann explains that the conduct-based, contract-based waiver distinction is 
another issue currently arising among federal courts. Id. Namely, the issue 
concerns whether conduct-based waiver is, in fact, a gateway issue. This Note 
does not address this issue. Rather, it adopts Professor Bermann’s notion that, 
from a purely doctrinal perspective, waiver by conduct should be considered a 
gateway issue under the severability doctrine and, thus, for the courts to decide. 
Id. at 42. 
 163. See Bermann, supra note 10, at 42 (stating that, for severability 
purposes, waiver “should be treated as a gateway issue”).  
 164. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) 
(“When deciding whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a certain 
matter . . . courts generally . . . should apply ordinary state-law principles that 
govern the formation of contracts.”); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 
(1987) (stating that a court may not “in assessing the rights of litigants to 
enforce an arbitration agreement, construe that agreement in a manner 
different from that in which it . . . construes nonarbitration agreements under 
state law”).  
 165.  See Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896, 1902 (2009) 
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however, it is first appropriate to address the circuit split 
surrounding this issue. Doing so will better frame the doctrinal 
conflict between arbitration and contract law engendered by the 
circuits’ waiver analyses; a conflict which clearly contravenes the 
FAA’s overarching objective and the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of its provisions.166 
III. The Circuit Split  
The Supreme Court’s gradual acceptance of arbitration 
agreements as contracts167 has caused “several oddities” to 
develop within the lower courts’ FAA jurisprudence.168 
Particularly, a circuit split has formed regarding the following 
question: Must a party resisting arbitration (nonmovant) show 
prejudice in order to prove that the party demanding arbitration 
(movant) waived its right to arbitrate by engaging in pretrial 
conduct?169 The divergence between the circuits denies 
predictability as to when, and in what forum—litigation or 
arbitration—parties’ claims will be adjudicated.170 As 
unpredictability begets instability, the current split denies 
contracting parties the key benefits derived through bargained-
for arbitral procedures.171 A succinct overview of the circuits’ 
                                                                                                     
(finding that FAA “§ 3 adds no substantive restriction to § 2’s enforceability 
mandate” and, as such, “traditional principles” of state contract law must 
govern courts’ analyses in construing parties’ arbitral rights).  
 166. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) 
(“The overarching purpose of the FAA . . . is to ensure the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined 
proceedings.”). 
 167. See supra Part II (discussing the evolution of the Supreme Court’s FAA 
jurisprudence over the last half-century). 
 168. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reconsidering the Employment Contract Exclusion 
in Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act: Correcting the Judiciary’s Failure of 
Statutory Vision, 1991 J. DISP. RESOL. 259, 261. 
 169. See supra Part I (framing the issues surrounding conduct-based 
waiver). 
 170. See supra Part I (describing the problems created by the inconsistency 
among the circuits for parties attempting to bargain for optimal arbitral 
procedures).  
 171. See supra Part II (describing the benefits derived through arbitration).  
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waiver analyses aptly illustrates how ineffective and doctrinally 
inaccurate the waiver doctrine truly is. 
A. The Majority: Circuits Requiring Prejudice 
1. Strict Enforcement: Circuits Imposing Burdensome Prejudice 
Requirements 
An overview of the circuits which impose burdensome 
prejudice requirements illustrates that the circuit split does not 
consist of a simple dichotomy—minority versus majority. Rather, 
it clearly conveys that no circuits’ standards are exactly the same. 
a. The Second Circuit 
The Second Circuit carries a strong presumption in favor of 
arbitration, and waiver will not be lightly inferred.172 In order to 
determine whether a party has waived its right to arbitrate, the 
court considers the time elapsed in litigation, the total amount of 
litigation conduct, and the degree of prejudice inflicted by the 
movant through such conduct.173 To find prejudice, the court 
considers the amount of discovery conducted which was not 
available in arbitration, delay, expense,174 and attempts to 
arbitrate motions that were previously lost on the merits in 
court.175 Prejudice is the critical component to the Second 
Circuit’s waiver analysis.176 Thus, courts will find waiver only if 
                                                                                                     
 172. See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of N.Y. v. Soft Drink & Brewery Workers 
Union Local 812, 242 F.3d 52, 57 (2d Cir. 2001) (describing the waiver 
standard).  
 173. See id. (noting that its test considers “the time elapsed from the 
commencement of litigation to the request for arbitration; . . . the amount of 
litigation (including exchanges of pleadings, any substantive motions, and 
discovery); and . . . proof of prejudice”). 
 174. See id. (stating that proof of prejudice includes “taking advantage of 
pre-trial discovery not available in arbitration, delay, and expense”).  
 175. See Thyssen, Inc. v. Calypso Shipping Corp. S.A., 310 F.3d 102, 105 (2d 
Cir. 2002) (“Prejudice can be substantive, such as when a party loses a motion 
on the merits and then attempts, in effect, to relitigate the issue by invoking 
arbitration . . . .” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 
 176. See id. (stating that “[t]he key to the waiver analysis is prejudice”).  
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the nonmovant proves adequate prejudice.177 For example, in 
Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co.,178 the court found that Oppenheimer 
& Co.’s pretrial conduct did not cause sufficient prejudice to 
warrant a finding of waiver.179 
In Rush, Rush opened an options trading account with 
Oppenheimer that required him to sign an arbitration 
agreement.180 After disputes arose concerning his account, 
however, Rush filed claims in federal court.181 After nearly eight 
months of pretrial activity, Oppenheimer moved to compel 
arbitration.182 During that time, Oppenheimer engaged in 
extensive discovery, brought a motion to dismiss, and raised 
numerous affirmative defenses to Rush’s complaint, all without 
demanding arbitration.183 
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s 
finding of waiver for three key reasons.184 First, it found that 
expense, delay, and motions to dismiss, standing alone, cannot 
cause sufficient prejudice to warrant a finding of waiver.185 
Second, it found that Oppenheimer’s demand for arbitration only 
                                                                                                     
 177. See Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 779 F.2d 885, 887 (2d Cir. 1985) 
(stating that waiver will be found “only when prejudice to the other party is 
demonstrated”).  
 178. See id. (summarizing the Second Circuit’s burdensome waiver 
standard). 
 179. See id. at 890 (“As indicated herein we think that . . . [movant’s] right 
to arbitrate has not been waived.”). 
 180. See id. at 886 (referencing the arbitration agreement as stating “that 
any controversy between the parties would be settled by arbitration”). 
 181. See id. (noting that Rush “alleged improper and excessive trading in his 
account”). 
 182. See id. at 885 (stating that “[a]fter approximately eight months of 
pretrial proceedings in the district court,” Oppenheimer moved to compel 
arbitration). 
 183. See id. at 887 (stating that Oppenheimer engaged in “rather extensive 
discovery, [brought] a motion to dismiss, and pos[ed] thirteen affirmative 
defenses to [Rush’s] amended complaint, all without raising the right to 
arbitration”).  
 184. See id. (reversing the district court, stating that its findings were 
insufficient to establish waiver).  
 185. See id. at 887–88 (noting that “delay in seeking arbitration” for eight 
months “is insufficient by itself to constitute” waiver, and that motions to 
dismiss are to be expected when “a plaintiff files an intricate complaint, setting 
forth numerous claims . . . partially related to, the arbitrable claims” (citations 
omitted)). 
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after the district court allowed Rush’s claim for punitive damages 
was not prejudicial.186 Indeed, the court rejected the notion that 
such conduct amounted to forum shopping.187 Rather, it found 
that Rush was “no worse off” than if Oppenheimer moved to 
compel arbitration at the outset of the dispute, as Rush could not 
claim punitive damages in arbitration at any time.188 Third, the 
court invoked precedent, and declined to repudiate prior Second 
Circuit decisions which refused to find prejudice in more 
egregious factual circumstances.189 Ultimately, the court found 
that Oppenheimer did not cause sufficient prejudice to warrant a 
finding of waiver.190 In another case, however, the court found 
waiver where a party delayed for eight months before demanding 
arbitration; submitted numerous answers, defenses, and 
counterclaims, none of which mentioned arbitration; actively 
pursued discovery; waited until just before trial to compel 
arbitration; and offered what the court considered a 
“disingenuous” excuse for delay.191 
b. The Fourth Circuit 
In the Fourth Circuit, waiver will be found if a movant so 
“substantially utilizes the litigation machinery” that compelling 
arbitration would prejudice the nonmovant.192 The critical inquiry 
                                                                                                     
 186. See id. at 890 (explaining why Oppenheimer’s attempts to change 
forums was not prejudicial).  
 187. See id. (“This is not an instance in which a party sensing an adverse 
court decision [is, in effect, allowed] a second chance in another forum.” (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted)).  
 188. See id. (finding that Rush “is no worse off proceeding now to arbitration 
than had [Oppenheimer] moved for arbitration immediately after being served 
with the . . . complaint” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 
 189. See id. (reasoning that “[s]ince [Rush] would not have been prejudiced 
by a later motion to arbitrate had [Oppenheimer’s] motion to dismiss been 
completely denied, [its] motion to compel arbitration following reversal . . . of 
[its] initial, partial success” could not have prejudiced “Rush either” (citing 
Sweater Bee By Banff, Ltd. v. Manhattan Indus., Inc., 754 F.2d 457, 466 (2d Cir. 
1985))). 
 190. See id. (finding that Oppenheimer’s “right to arbitrate has not been 
waived”).  
 191. See Leadertex, Inc. v. Morganton Dyeing & Finishing Corp., 67 F.3d 20, 
26 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 192. MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Lauricia, 268 F.3d 244, 249 (4th Cir. 2001). 
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is whether the nonmovant has satisfied its “heavy burden” to 
prove prejudice.193 To find prejudice, the court considers the 
totality of the movant’s delay and pretrial conduct.194 For 
example, in MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Lauricia,195 the court found 
that Lauricia failed to prove the degree of prejudice necessary to 
establish waiver.196  
In MicroStrategy, MicroStrategy responded to Lauricia’s 
employment discrimination charges by filing three separate 
claims against her in state and federal court, despite the 
arbitration clause in her employment contract.197 Six months 
after its initial filing, MicroStrategy moved to compel 
arbitration.198 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district 
court’s finding of waiver on two key grounds.199 First, it refused to 
find prejudice when most of the claims adjudicated in court were 
unrelated to those subject to arbitration.200 Second, it found that 
Lauricia failed to prove whether MicroStrategy used pretrial 
discovery procedures to obtain information which would have 
been unavailable in arbitration.201 Thus, the court concluded that 
Lauricia failed to prove a sufficient degree of prejudice to 
establish waiver.202 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit has refused to 
                                                                                                     
 193. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 194. See id. (finding that “delay and the extent of the moving party’s trial-
oriented activity are material factors in assessing a plea of prejudice”).  
 195. See id. at 254 (reversing the “district court’s conclusion that 
MicroStrategy waived its right to arbitration”). 
 196. See id. (finding that Lauricia failed to prove “that she suffered the kind 
of prejudice necessary to support a finding that MicroStrategy waived its right” 
to arbitrate).  
 197. See id. at 246 (noting that the clause required the parties “to arbitrate 
[a]ny controversy or claim arising out of or relating to [the] . . . employment 
relationship”). 
 198. See id. at 250 (“[T]he time between the filing of the first action and the 
arbitration request was . . . six months.”). 
 199. See id. at 248 (reversing the district court’s determination that 
MicroStrategy waived its right to arbitrate).  
 200. See id. at 251 (refusing to find prejudice where most of the litigation 
was “directed to claims unrelated to those” subject to arbitration).  
 201. See id. at 254 (refusing to “conclude that Lauricia was prejudiced by the 
minimal amount of information obtained by MicroStrategy that” was likely 
obtainable in arbitration).  
 202. See id. (“Because Lauricia has failed to establish that she suffered the 
kind of prejudice necessary to support a finding that MicroStrategy waived its 
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find prejudice where a movant delayed its demand for arbitration 
for eight months; filed “affirmative defenses, engaged in 
discovery, and responded to motions”; moved for arbitration three 
months before trial; and inflicted undue costs because of its 
conduct.203 
c. The Fifth Circuit 
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit finds waiver “when the party 
seeking arbitration substantially invokes the judicial process to 
the detriment or prejudice of the other party.”204 The court holds 
a presumption against finding waiver, and places a heavy burden 
on nonmovants to prove that waiver is appropriate.205 Finally, 
prejudice results when a movant inflicts delay, expense, or forces 
the nonmovant to arbitrate issues already disputed in court.206 
Applying its test, the court in Walker v. J.C. Bradford & Co.207 
found that Plaintiffs failed to show a sufficient degree of prejudice 
to warrant a finding of waiver.208 
In Walker, Plaintiffs filed suit in state court, alleging various 
state securities law violations, despite the arbitration agreement 
in their contract with Bradford.209 Thirteen months after 
Plaintiffs’ initial filing, Bradford removed the case to federal 
                                                                                                     
right to insist on arbitration, the district court erred by denying MicroStrategy’s 
motion to compel arbitration.”).  
 203. Patten Grading & Paving, Inc. v. Skanska USA Bldg., Inc., 380 F.3d 
200, 205–08 (4th Cir. 2004). 
 204. Walker v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 938 F.2d 575, 577 (5th Cir. 1991) 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 205. See id. (holding “a presumption against finding waiver” and placing “a 
heavy burden of proof” on nonmovants attempting to establish waiver).  
 206. See Republic Ins. Co. v. PAICO Receivables, LLC, 383 F.3d 341, 346 
(5th Cir. 2004) (finding prejudice when a movant inflicts “delay, expense, or 
damage to a [nonmovant’s] legal position,” which occurs when the nonmovant is 
forced to arbitrate an issue which was previously litigated (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted)). 
 207. See Walker, 938 F.2d at 578 (finding that Bradford’s “actions in federal 
court were not so substantial as to mandate that we overcome the legal 
presumption” against waiver). 
 208. See id. (finding that Plaintiffs did not present “enough evidence” that 
Bradford’s conduct “materially prejudiced them”).  
 209. See id. at 576 (describing the pretrial process in which the parties 
engaged before Bradford moved to compel arbitration).   
“WAIVING” GOODBYE TO ARBITRATION 1641 
court and subsequently moved to compel arbitration.210 On 
appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s finding of 
waiver on three grounds.211 First, the court cast Plaintiffs’ claims 
of cost and delay as “generalized protestations,” insufficient to 
“overcome the strong federal presumption in favor of 
arbitration.”212 Second, the court found Bradford’s pretrial 
conduct—its removal to federal court, preliminary 
interrogatories, document requests, and answer—insufficient, in 
light of prior precedent, to establish prejudice.213 Finally, the 
court refused to find discovery prejudicial without proof that 
Bradford obtained information which was unavailable in 
arbitration.214 Ultimately, the court found that Plaintiffs failed to 
satisfy their heavy burden to prove prejudice and, thus, establish 
waiver.215 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit has refused to find 
prejudice where a movant delayed for eight months before 
demanding arbitration; filed an answer, interrogatories, and 
document production requests; moved for protective orders; and 
agreed to a joint motion to extend the discovery period.216 
                                                                                                     
 210. See id. (“Thirteen months after plaintiffs filed suit, defendant filed a 
motion to compel arbitration and to stay proceedings.”). 
 211. See id. at 577 (reversing the district court’s finding of waiver).  
 212. Id. at 578. 
 213. See id. at 576–77 (discussing Bradford’s pretrial conduct and citing 
prior decisions in which the court refused to find prejudice where parties 
“invoked the judicial process to approximately the same extent as Bradford” 
(citing Tenneco Resins, Inc. v. Davy Int’l, A.G., 770 F.2d 416, 420–21 (5th Cir. 
1985))). 
 214. See id. at 578 n.3 (stating that that if Bradford’s discovery conduct 
“revealed items that would not be discoverable in arbitration proceedings,” it 
would “be more likely to find that plaintiffs were prejudiced”); see also 
MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Lauricia, 268 F.3d 244, 251 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding that if 
“the same information could have been obtained in an arbitration proceeding,” 
then the nonmovant suffers no prejudice). 
 215. See Walker v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 938 F.2d 575, 578 (5th Cir. 1991) 
(finding Plaintiffs’ evidence “insufficient to overcome the strong federal 
presumption in favor of arbitration” (citations omitted)).  
 216. See Tenneco Resins, Inc. v. Davy Int’l, A.G., 770 F.2d 416, 420 (5th Cir. 
1985) (describing the movant’s pretrial conduct).  
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d. The Sixth Circuit 
The Sixth Circuit addresses arbitral issues “in light of the 
strong federal policy” favoring arbitration.217 The court holds a 
presumption in favor of arbitration under its two-pronged test, 
and waiver will not be lightly inferred.218 Indeed, the court will 
find waiver only where a movant takes actions that are 
inconsistent with any reliance on the arbitration agreement, and 
where it delays demanding arbitration to an extent which 
prejudices the nonmovant.219 Prejudice may be found when a 
movant inflicts undue delay and expense.220 For example, in 
Hurley v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas,221 the court found 
waiver where Defendants’ conduct satisfied both elements of its 
test.222 
In Hurley, the Hurleys filed federal statutory and state law 
claims in federal court against Defendants, despite the 
arbitration clause in their mortgage documents.223 After two 
years of pretrial activity, Defendants moved to compel 
arbitration.224 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district 
                                                                                                     
 217. Hurley v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams., 610 F.3d 334, 338 (6th Cir. 
2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  
 218. See id. (“Because of the presumption in favor of arbitration under the 
Federal Arbitration Act, we will not lightly infer a party’s waiver . . . .” (citations 
omitted)).  
 219. See id. (finding waiver where a party takes “actions that are completely 
inconsistent with any reliance on an arbitration agreement,” and “delay[s] its 
assertion to such an extent that the opposing party incurs actual prejudice”) 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 220. Gen. Star Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat, 289 F.3d 
434, 438 (6th Cir. 2002) (stating that prejudice will be found when a party 
incurs “unnecessary delay or expense” (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted)). 
 221. See Hurley, 610 F.3d at 338 (concluding that Defendants’ conduct 
satisfied “both factors indicating waiver”). 
 222. See id. at 340 (finding Defendant’s actions “completely inconsistent 
with any reliance on an arbitration agreement,” and that Defendants “delayed 
asserting their right to arbitrate to such an extent that they . . . actually 
prejudiced” the Hurleys). 
 223. See id. at 336 (quoting the arbitration clause in the mortgage 
documents as requiring “[a]ll disputes, claims, or controversies arising from or 
related to the loan . . . be resolved by binding arbitration, and not by court 
action”). 
 224. See id. at 338 (noting that Defendants failed to demand arbitration for 
over two years from the time the Hurleys “initiated this lawsuit”).  
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court’s finding of waiver under its two-pronged test.225 First, it 
found Defendants’ persistent and active pretrial activity over the 
course of two years inconsistent with any reliance on the parties’ 
arbitration agreement.226 Second, the court found that because 
the Hurleys conducted substantial discovery, argued numerous 
summary judgment motions, and changed venue at Defendants’ 
request, they suffered prejudice as a result of Defendants’ 
delay.227 Thus, in light of such conduct, the court found that 
Defendants waived their right to arbitrate.228 Similarly, the Sixth 
Circuit has found waiver where a movant delayed demanding 
arbitration for one year, during which time it engaged in 
extensive discovery and filed numerous pretrial motions.229 
e. The Ninth Circuit 
The Ninth Circuit also applies its test in light of the liberal 
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.230 Furthermore, 
nonmovants bear a heavy burden of proof in establishing each 
element of its three-pronged test.231 Particularly, a nonmovant 
must show that the movant knew of its right to compel 
arbitration; that the movant acted inconsistently with that right; 
                                                                                                     
 225. See id. at 340 (finding Defendants’ actions both completely inconsistent 
with any reliance on the arbitration agreement and prejudicial).  
 226. See id. at 338–39 (finding that Defendants’ numerous “dispositive and 
nondispositive motions,” including “motions to dismiss, motions for summary 
judgment, and a motion to change venue,” indicated little, if any, reliance).  
 227. See id. at 340 (finding prejudice where Defendants’ delay caused the 
Hurleys to incur “the costs of active litigation in two federal courts,” employ 
“four attorneys, undergo[] extensive discovery, argue[] four summary judgment 
motions,” and change “venue at Defendants’ request”).  
 228. See id. (concluding that “Defendants have waived their right to 
arbitrate” and affirming the district court’s order “denying Defendants’ motion 
to compel arbitration”). 
 229. See Manasher v. NECC Telecom, 310 F. App’x 804, 805–06 (6th Cir. 
2009) (finding that the movant waived its right to arbitrate where it delayed 
demanding arbitration for one year, “engaged in discovery[,] and participated 
in . . .motions to certify [a] class and to amend the complaint”). 
 230. See Sovak v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 280 F.3d 1266, 1270 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(stating that “waiver must be resolved in light of the FAA’s preference for 
arbitration” (citations omitted)).  
 231. See id. (finding that nonmovants bear a “heavy burden of proof in 
showing” that its test is met (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).   
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and that it suffered prejudice because of the movant’s delayed 
demand for arbitration.232 For example, in Fisher v. A.G. Becker 
Paribas, Inc.,233 the court refused to find waiver when the Fishers 
failed to prove each element of its test.234 
In Fisher, the Fishers filed claims in federal court alleging 
violations of various federal securities and state common laws.235 
Three-and-one-half years after the Fishers filed their claims, 
Becker moved to compel arbitration.236 During that time, both 
parties “filed pretrial motions and engaged in extensive 
discovery.”237 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district 
court’s finding of waiver on two key grounds.238 First, it found 
that Becker did not act inconsistently with its right to arbitrate 
because, under the intertwining doctrine, the Fishers’ arbitrable 
claims could not be separated from their nonarbitrable securities 
claims, making the entire dispute nonarbitrable.239 The Supreme 
Court has since rejected both the intertwining doctrine and the 
notion that federal securities claims are not arbitrable.240 Second, 
                                                                                                     
 232. See id. (finding waiver where the nonmovant shows that “(1) [the 
movant] had knowledge of its existing right to compel arbitration; (2) [the 
movant] acted inconsistently with that existing right; and (3) [the nonmovant] 
suffered prejudice from [the movant’s] delay in moving to compel arbitration”). 
 233. See Fisher v. A.G. Becker Paribas, Inc., 791 F.2d 691, 694–98 (9th Cir. 
1986) (describing extensive pretrial conduct by a movant that did not amount to 
a waiver of the right to arbitrate).  
 234. See id. at 698 (“The Fishers have failed to support their contention that 
Becker acted inconsistently with an existing right to compel arbitration . . . [or] 
to demonstrate any prejudice resulting from the alleged inconsistent acts.”). 
 235. See id. at 693 (noting that the Fishers alleged violations of “federal 
securities laws as well as . . . [state] common law claims”). 
 236. See id. (finding that Becker delayed demanding arbitration for three 
and one-half years).  
 237. Id.  
 238. See id. at 698 (reversing the district court’s finding of waiver and 
ordering that “any arbitrable claims be submitted to arbitration immediately”).  
 239. See id. at 694–95 (noting that the intertwining doctrine “holds that 
when it is impractical if not impossible to separate out nonarbitrable from 
arbitrable claims, a court should deny arbitration in order to preserve its 
exclusive jurisdiction over federal securities claims” (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted)).  
 240. See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 220–21 
(1987) (“Exchange Act claims are arbitrable under the provisions of the 
Arbitration Act.”); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217 (1985) 
(“[T]he Arbitration Act requires district courts to compel arbitration of pendent 
arbitrable claims . . . even where the result would be possibly inefficient 
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the court found that Becker’s failure to raise arbitration as an 
affirmative defense, the possibility that there may be some 
duplication of efforts in litigation and arbitration, and the 
Fishers’ own failure to demand arbitration by filing claims in 
court, were factors in concluding that the Fishers failed to 
establish prejudice and, thus, waiver.241  
Although Fisher may simply be a product of its time,242 the 
Ninth Circuit continues to require a strong showing of prejudice. 
For example, it has found prejudice only where a movant’s 
actions caused “staleness of [a] claim” and subjected the 
nonmovant to litigation in state court, including discovery, the 
costs of litigation, and a judgment on the merits.243 The court also 
refused to find prejudice when a nonmovant incurred significant 
costs in the pretrial stages of litigation, but expressed more of a 
willingness to find prejudice had the case proceeded through 
discovery and a trial.244 
f. The Eleventh Circuit 
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit applies its two-pronged test in 
light of the strong federal policy favoring arbitration.245 It foists a 
heavy burden upon parties attempting to satisfy its test and 
invoke waiver.246 To meet its test, a nonmovant must prove that 
                                                                                                     
maintenance of separate proceedings in different forums.”). 
 241. See Fisher v. A.G. Becker Paribas, Inc., 791 F.2d 691, 697–98 (9th Cir. 
1986) (discussing the grounds on which the court refused to find prejudice).  
 242. See supra note 240 and accompanying text (describing the Supreme 
Court’s refutation of the intertwining doctrine and the notion that federal 
securities claims are not arbitrable). 
 243. Hoffman Constr. Co. of Or. v. Active Erectors and Installers, Inc., 969 
F.2d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 244. See United Computer Sys., Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 298 F.3d 756, 765 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (stating that if the “defendants permitted the case to proceed to 
discovery and to a trial, an argument of prejudice . . . would be much more 
compelling”); but see Lewallen v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 487 F.3d 1085, 
1093 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding that a motion to dismiss can cause sufficient 
prejudice to warrant a finding of waiver). 
 245. See Citibank, N.A. v. Stok & Assocs., P.A., 387 F. App’x 921, 923 (11th 
Cir. 2010) (stating that “federal law favors arbitration” (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted)).  
 246. See id. (“[A]ny party arguing waiver of arbitration bears a heavy 
burden of proof.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).  
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the movant acted inconsistently with its right to arbitrate, and 
that it was prejudiced by the movant’s acts.247 A movant acts 
inconsistently with its right to arbitrate when its conduct, 
including pretrial activity, indicates an intent to avoid 
arbitration.248 To find prejudice, the court considers the length of 
delay, expense, and damage to the nonmovant’s legal position 
incurred through discovery.249 For example, in Stone v. E.F. 
Hutton & Co., Inc.,250 the court found Hutton’s delay and pretrial 
conduct sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a finding of waiver.251 
In Stone, Plaintiff filed claims in federal court despite its 
arbitration agreement with Hutton.252 It alleged various federal 
and Florida securities law violations, as well as common law 
claims.253 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s finding of waiver under its two-pronged test.254 First, the 
court found that Hutton’s one-year-and-eight-month delay 
rendered its motion “untimely.”255 Second, the court found 
                                                                                                     
 247. See Ivax Corp. v. B. Braun of Am., Inc., 286 F.3d 1309, 1315–16 (11th 
Cir. 2002) (articulating its test as a means to determine whether, “under the 
totality of the circumstances, a party has acted inconsistently with the 
arbitration right and, second . . . whether, by doing so, that party has in some 
way prejudiced the other party” (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted)).  
 248. See Stok, 387 F. App’x at 924 (stating that a party acts inconsistently 
with the right to arbitrate when its conduct, “including [substantial] 
participation in litigation . . . manifests an intent to avoid or waive arbitration” 
(citations omitted)). 
 249. See id. (evaluating “the prejudice prong by considering the length of 
delay in demanding arbitration,” expenses incurred, and the extent to which 
pretrial discovery damaged the nonmovant’s legal position (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted)).   
 250. See Stone v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 898 F.2d 1542, 1544 (11th Cir. 
1990) (describing how the movant’s conduct caused a sufficient degree of 
prejudice to warrant a finding of waiver).  
 251. See id. (finding both the “extent of discovery conducted” and the extent 
of Hutton’s delay sufficient to warrant a finding of waiver).  
 252. See id. at 1543 (noting that the arbitration agreement required “any 
controversy arising out of” Plaintiff’s account to be “settled by arbitration”).  
 253. See id. at 1542 (noting that plaintiff’s complaint alleged a violation of 
“section 10(b)” of the “Securities Exchange Act of 1934,” Florida securities law 
violations, and “common law fraud, negligence, and breach of fiduciary 
obligations”).   
 254. See id. (affirming the “district court’s order denying [Hutton’s] motion 
to compel arbitration”).  
 255. Id. at 1544.  
“WAIVING” GOODBYE TO ARBITRATION 1647 
Hutton’s conduct prejudicial because it engaged in discovery 
typically conducted by parties preparing for trial.256 Particularly, 
Hutton deposed Plaintiff twice and responded to document 
production requests, while Plaintiff submitted four sets of 
interrogatories, three document production requests, and 
scheduled numerous depositions.257 As such, the court concluded 
that Hutton waived its right to arbitrate.258 Similarly, the 
Eleventh Circuit has found waiver where a movant delayed for 
eight months before demanding arbitration.259 During that time, 
the movant deposed five of the nonmovant’s “employees (totaling 
approximately 430 pages),” and the nonmovant filed both a 
motion to dismiss and a motion to oppose discovery.260 
g. A Brief Summary: The Strict Enforcement Divergence 
A comparative analysis of the circuits which impose 
burdensome prejudice requirements illustrates three significant 
problems. First, and most importantly, their onerous standards 
conflict with the FAA’s overarching objective.261 Each approach 
sacrifices procedural expedience and efficiency in the name of 
strict contractual enforcement.262 The Supreme Court, however, 
                                                                                                     
 256. See id. (finding Hutton’s conduct prejudicial because it engaged in 
“discovery typical of a party preparing for trial”). 
 257. See id. at 1543 (describing the parties’ pretrial conduct). 
 258. See id. at 1544 (concluding that Hutton “waived its right to compel 
arbitration”).  
 259. See S&H Contractors, Inc. v. A.J. Taft Coal Co., 906 F.2d 1507, 1514 
(11th Cir. 1990) (“In this case, S&H waited eight months from the time it filed 
its complaint to the time it demanded arbitration.”). 
 260. Id.  
 261. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) 
(“The overarching purpose of the FAA . . . is to ensure the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined 
proceedings.”). 
 262. See, e.g., Walker v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 938 F.2d 575, 578 (5th Cir. 
1991) (refusing to find waiver in light of the strong federal policy favoring 
arbitration agreements, but conceding that movant’s conduct wasted both the 
court’s and the parties’ time); Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 779 F.2d 885, 891 (2d 
Cir. 1985) (“Although granting defendants’ demand for arbitration . . . may be 
sanctioning a less efficient means of resolving this dispute, we reemphasize that 
neither efficiency nor judicial economy is the primary goal behind the 
arbitration act.”).  
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has expressed a desire to avoid such conflict where possible.263 
Second, the divergence between each circuit’s analysis detracts 
from the predictive power and stability that parties expect 
through bargained-for arbitral procedures.264 Compounding this 
problem is that courts within the same circuit often arrive at 
discrepant outcomes in similar factual circumstances.265  
Finally, a number of circuits which propagate burdensome 
prejudice requirements have regarded their holdings with 
disdain. For example, in MicroStrategy, the Fourth Circuit 
recognized that MicroStrategy took an aggressive “course of 
litigation for the sole purpose of wearing [Lauricia] out, both 
emotionally and financially.”266 Similarly, in Walker, the Fifth 
Circuit “sympathized with [P]laintiffs’ exasperation,” conceding 
that Bradford’s attempts “to switch judicial horses in midstream” 
wasted both the courts’ and the parties’ time.267 Further, the 
Second Circuit stated that it would refuse to find waiver without 
a strong showing of prejudice, no matter how “unjustifiable” a 
movant’s conduct.268 Ultimately, burdensome prejudice 
requirements both flout parties’ legitimate expectations of 
stability and contravene the FAA’s overarching objective.269 A 
more concrete, contractual approach is needed to unify the 
circuits’ analyses within the scope of the FAA.  
                                                                                                     
 263. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1749 (discussing how the FAA’s two 
underlying goals need not, and should not, conflict).  
 264. See supra Part II (describing the benefits that parties expect through 
arbitration).  
 265. For example, district courts within the Sixth Circuit have applied its 
waiver standard in an inconsistent manner. Compare U.S. Enrichment Corp. v. 
Sw. Elec. Co., Inc., No. 5:07CV-36-R, 2008 WL 199881, at *1, *5 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 
23, 2008) (refusing to find waiver after two years of negotiations, pretrial 
activity, and costs because the nonmovant reserved its right to arbitrate at the 
outset of negotiations and there was no “bad faith”), with Johnson Assocs. Corp. 
v. HL Operating Corp., No. 3:09-CV-01206, 2010 WL 4942788, at *1, *5 (M.D. 
Tenn. Nov. 30, 2010) (finding waiver where “the right to arbitrate was not 
asserted for eight months, during which” time the parties engaged in pretrial 
conduct). 
 266. MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Lauricia, 268 F.3d 244, 254 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 267. Walker v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 938 F.2d 575, 577–78 (5th Cir. 1991). 
 268. Leadertex, Inc. v. Morganton Dyeing & Finishing Corp., 67 F.3d 20, 26 
(2d Cir. 1995). 
 269. See supra Part II (discussing the benefits that parties expect through 
bargained-for arbitral procedures).  
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2. Circuits Imposing Lenient Prejudice Requirements 
a. The First Circuit 
The First Circuit holds that the key factors to finding waiver 
are undue delay and a “modicum of prejudice to the other side.”270 
Although some showing is required, its prejudice standard is 
“tame at best.”271 To avoid waiver, the First Circuit requires that 
parties demand arbitration at the earliest opportunity in order to 
ensure that courts’ and parties’ “resources are not needlessly 
deployed.”272 For example, in Rankin v. Allstate Insurance Co.,273 
the court found Allstate’s conduct sufficiently prejudicial to 
warrant a finding of waiver.274 
In Rankin, the Rankins filed suit against Allstate in federal 
district court, alleging breach of contract.275 Nine months after 
the Rankins filed their claim, Allstate moved to compel 
arbitration.276 On appeal, the First Circuit first found Allstate’s 
nine-month delay unacceptable, as it knew of the coming dispute 
with the Rankins as early as one month before they filed their 
claim in court.277 Second, the court found prejudice “inherent in 
wasted trial preparation” when a party demands arbitration after 
months of delay and a short time before trial.278 Therefore, the 
                                                                                                     
 270. Rankin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 336 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 2003). 
 271. Id. at 14 (citations omitted). 
 272. Id. at 13 (citations omitted). 
 273. See id. at 14 (finding that Allstate waived its right to arbitrate by 
inflicting prejudice through undue delay). 
 274. See id. 
 275. See id. at 11 (noting that the dispute between the Rankins and Allstate 
concerned “[w]hether Allstate unreasonably delayed payment of what was due 
[under the Rankins’ insurance contract], whether it still owe[d] money, and 
whether it lost its right to invoke the arbitration provision”). 
 276. See id. at 10. (noting that although litigation began on March 2, 2001, 
Allstate did not demand arbitration until nine months later on December 19, 
2001, less than two months before the trial date set for February 11, 2002). 
 277. See id. at 12–13 (noting that “by February 2001 the parties were in 
disagreement” about numerous issues, approximately two months before 
Allstate filed “its April 2001 answer to the complaint filed in March 2001” by the 
Rankins). 
 278. See id. at 14 (finding prejudice where “an arbitration demand is 
made . . . after many months of delay and only six weeks before . . . trial”). 
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court concluded that Allstate’s delay, standing alone, was 
sufficient to fulfill the modicum of prejudice necessary to 
establish waiver.279 Similarly, the First Circuit has found 
expenses incurred as a result of dilatory behavior sufficient to 
warrant a finding of prejudice, even when no useful information 
was acquired through discovery.280 
b. The Eighth Circuit 
The Eighth Circuit, by contrast, employs a three-pronged test 
which mirrors the Ninth Circuit’s. Particularly, a party may 
waive its right to arbitrate if it: “(1) knew of an existing right to 
arbitrat[e]; (2) acted inconsistently with that right; and 
(3) prejudiced the other party by these inconsistent acts.”281 A 
party acts inconsistently with its right to arbitrate if it attempts 
to litigate arbitrable claims, conducts substantial discovery, or 
delays its demand for arbitration.282 The prejudice threshold is 
not “onerous,”283 and may be met when a movant inflicts 
unnecessary delay, expense, or when compelling arbitration 
would require a “duplication of efforts” in multiple forums to 
resolve the dispute.284 For example, in Lewallen v. Green Tree 
                                                                                                     
 279. See id. (finding that Allstate waived “its right to arbitration”). 
 280. See Menorah Ins. Co. v. INX Reinsurance Corp., 72 F.3d 218, 222 (1st 
Cir. 1995) (finding prejudice when the nonmovant incurred unnecessary costs 
through pretrial discovery, even when no “information useful to the resolution of 
the dispute was . . . procured”). 
 281. Lewallen v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 487 F.3d 1085, 1090 (8th Cir. 
2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Sovak v. Chugai 
Pharm. Co., 280 F.3d 1266, 1270 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Sovak must show (1) Cook 
had knowledge of its existing right to compel arbitration; (2) Cook acted 
inconsistently with that existing right; and (3) he suffered prejudice from Cook’s 
delay in moving to compel arbitration.”). 
 282. See Lewallen, 487 F.3d at 1090 (finding that a party acts inconsistently 
with its right to arbitrate by “fil[ing] a lawsuit on arbitrable claims, engag[ing] 
in extensive discovery, or fail[ing] to move to compel arbitration and stay 
litigation in a timely manner”).  
 283. Hooper v. Advance Am., Cash Advance Ctrs. of Mo., Inc., 589 F.3d 917, 
923 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 284. Lewallen, 487 F.3d at 1093 (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted).  
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Servicing, LLC,285 the court found Green Tree’s delay and pretrial 
conduct sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a finding of waiver.286 
In Lewallen, Lewallen filed for bankruptcy due to arrearages 
on a home loan that was purchased, and serviced, by Green 
Tree.287 In response to Green Tree’s proof of claim, Lewallen filed 
two rounds of discovery requests and counterclaimed for various 
violations of state and federal lending laws.288 Sixteen months 
later, Green Tree moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the 
arbitration clause in the parties’ loan agreement.289 Applying its 
test, the Eighth Circuit affirmed both the bankruptcy court’s and 
the district courts’ findings of waiver.290  
First, the Eighth Circuit found that Green Tree’s pretrial 
conduct—its lengthy delay, interrogatories, document production 
requests, and motion to dismiss—was inconsistent with its right 
to arbitrate.291 The court found Green Tree’s motion to dismiss 
particularly egregious, noting that it pressed the bankruptcy 
court to resolve Lewallen’s claims on the merits, while preserving 
arbitration as an alternative forum in case of an adverse 
                                                                                                     
 285.  See id. (finding Green Tree’s conduct both inconsistent with its right to 
compel arbitration and prejudicial). 
 286. See id. at 1094 (concluding “that Green Tree waived its right to 
arbitrate Lewallen’s claims,” and denying Green Tree’s motion to compel 
arbitration). 
 287. See id. at 1088–89 (noting that Green Tree purchased the right to 
service Lewallen’s home loan, which was in default at the time of transfer, in 
2002 and attempted to foreclose on her home in 2004).  
 288. See id. at 1089 (stating that Lewallen objected to Green Tree’s proof of 
claim and “alleged that Green Tree’s conduct violated the Real Estate 
Settlement Procedures Act, . . . the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act . . . and 
the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act”). 
 289. See id. at 1091 (quoting the arbitration agreement which “provided that 
[Green Tree] retains an option to use judicial or non-judicial relief to enforce a 
security agreement relating to the collateral secured in a transaction underlying 
this arbitration agreement, to enforce the monetary obligation or to foreclose on 
the collateral”). 
 290. See id. at 1090, 1094 (discussing and affirming both the bankruptcy 
and the district courts’ findings that Green Tree waived its right to arbitrate).  
 291. See id. at 1092–93 (finding that Green Tree’s merits-based motion to 
dismiss, discovery requests, “lengthy interrogatories,”  requests for the 
“production of documents after adversary proceeding[s] commenced,” and 
motions to extend the “time to respond to Lewallen’s discovery requests” were 
inconsistent with its right to arbitrate).  
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ruling.292 Turning to prejudice, the court found Green Tree’s 
motion to dismiss and inexplicable delay prejudicial in light of 
Lewallen’s precarious financial situation.293 As such, the court 
concluded that Green Tree’s conduct was sufficiently prejudicial 
to warrant a finding of waiver.294 Similarly, the Eighth Circuit 
has found waiver when a movant delayed for four and one-half 
months before demanding arbitration; filed a motion to dismiss 
which required the nonmovants to litigate a number of 
substantive claims; and the movant would have sought to reargue 
any adverse rulings in arbitration.295 
c. Lenient Prejudice Requirements: A Brief Comparison 
It is first important to note the obvious doctrinal divergence 
between the First and Eighth Circuits’ lenient prejudice 
requirements, and the burdensome requirements imposed by 
other circuits within the majority. The discrepancy between the 
Eighth and Ninth Circuits’ prejudice standards is particularly 
illustrative, given their virtually identical three-pronged waiver 
tests.296  
The First and Eighth Circuits’ prejudice standards diverge as 
well. The Eighth Circuit, conscious of the current circuit split 
regarding the prejudice requirement,297 has abandoned prejudice 
                                                                                                     
 292. See id. at 1092 (finding that Green Tree’s motion to dismiss essentially 
“urg[ed] the bankruptcy court to dispose of Lewallen’s claims on the merits, 
reserving arbitration as an alternative avenue to resolve the dispute”).  
 293. See id. at 1093 (finding the totality of Green Tree’s conduct prejudicial, 
particularly because any wasted “time and expense” would prejudice Lewallen 
at a time “when she [could] ill afford to waste resources”—in bankruptcy).  
 294. See id. at 1094 (concluding that “Green Tree waived its right to 
arbitrate Lewallen’s claims”).  
 295. Hooper v. Advance Am., Cash Advance Ctrs. of Mo., Inc., 589 F.3d 917, 
922–23 (8th Cir. 2009) (finding waiver when the movant “waited over four-and-
a-half months before filing its motion for arbitration”; when the movant’s 
“motion to dismiss forced Plantiffs to brief fully a number of substantive issues”; 
and when the movant “would presumably . . . reargue in arbitration issues it 
lost” in its motion to dismiss).  
 296. See supra note 281 and accompanying text (describing the virtually 
identical waiver tests shared by the Eighth and Ninth Circuits).  
 297. See Erdman Co. v. Phoenix Land & Acquisition, LLC, 650 F.3d 1115, 
1118–19 (8th Cir. 2011) (“There is a circuit split over whether the party 
asserting waiver must show prejudice . . . . [on which] [t]he Supreme Court in 
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altogether in certain circumstances.298 By contrast, the First 
Circuit requires some showing of prejudice in all circumstances to 
find waiver, although a small degree is sufficient.299 
To be sure, both circuits’ lenient requirements have 
prevented manipulation300 and delay301 much more effectively 
than the strict-enforcement regimes.302 The chaotic state of the 
current waiver doctrine, however, deprives contracting parties of 
any jurisprudential predictability. Rather, a uniform, contractual 
approach would stabilize the current doctrine and realign the 
circuits’ analyses within the scope of the FAA. 
3. The Third and Tenth Circuits: Multifactor Tests 
Both the Third and Tenth Circuits require some showing of 
prejudice to find waiver. A separate analysis, however, provides 
an illustrative microcosm of the overall inconsistencies caused by 
the waiver doctrine. Despite both circuits’ facially similar 
multifactor waiver regimes, each differs significantly in 
application. 
                                                                                                     
the Term just ended granted a petition for a writ of certiorari . . . .” (citations 
omitted)).  
 298. See id. at 1120 (finding the prejudice requirement unnecessary “[i]n the 
realm of construction industry disputes”). 
 299. See Rankin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 336 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 2003) (“[T]he 
components of waiver of an arbitration clause are undue delay and a modicum of 
prejudice to the other side.”).  
 300. See, e.g., Menorah Ins. Co. v. INX Reinsurance Corp., 72 F.3d 218, 222–
23 (1st Cir. 1995) (refusing to allow the use of arbitration agreements for 
purposes of “manipulation and mischief”).  
 301. See, e.g., Erdman, 650 F.3d at 1120 (finding that “it makes little sense 
to litigate endlessly over the details of prejudice” in certain circumstances); 
Rankin, 336 F.3d at 13 (stating that its particular concern when evaluating 
prejudice is “when a timely demand for arbitration must be made” in order to 
facilitate “efficient planning by the court” and adequate protection of “the 
opponent”). 
 302. See supra notes 266–68 and accompanying text (discussing the Second, 
Fourth, and Fifth Circuits’ awareness of the delay and manipulation facilitated 
by their burdensome prejudice requirements).  
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a. The Third Circuit 
The Third Circuit’s “nonexclusive list of factors relevant to 
the prejudice inquiry” includes the timeliness of the motion to 
compel arbitration; the extent to which the movant has contested 
the merits of the nonmovant’s claims; whether the movant has 
informed the nonmovant of its intent to seek arbitration; the 
number of “nonmerits” motions submitted by the movant; the 
movant’s assent to the court’s pretrial orders; and the extent to 
which both parties conducted discovery.303 The court applies its 
test contextually, and not all of the factors need be present to 
establish a finding of prejudice.304 For example, in Nino v. 
Jewelry Exchange, Inc.,305 the court found waiver where only four 
of the six factors weighed in favor of finding prejudice.306 
In Nino, Nino brought an employment discrimination suit in 
federal court against DI, his former employer.307 After fifteen 
months, DI moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the 
arbitration clause in Nino’s employment contract.308 Applying its 
test, the Third Circuit reversed the district court’s refusal to find 
waiver.309 Particularly, it found DI’s delay; the “substantial 
amounts of time, effort, and money” Nino spent prosecuting the 
action; DI’s participation in numerous pretrial conferences; and 
the significant amount of discovery conducted by the parties 
sufficient to cause four of the six factors to weigh in favor of 
prejudice.310 As such, the court found DI’s conduct sufficiently 
                                                                                                     
 303. See Nino v. Jewelry Exch., Inc., 609 F.3d 191, 208–09 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 304. See id. at 209 (characterizing its factors as comprising “a nonexclusive 
list” which need not all be present to justify a finding of waiver, and which must 
be applied “based on the circumstances and the context of the particular case” 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).  
 305. See id. at 209–13 (applying and discussing each of its six factors). 
 306. See id. at 213–14 (finding waiver where four of the six factors heavily 
indicated prejudice). 
 307. See id. at 196 (noting that Nino alleged “he was discriminated against 
on account of his gender and national origin”). 
 308. See id. (“After litigating the matter before the District Court for fifteen 
months, the employer invoked an arbitration provision . . . and moved . . . to 
compel the parties to arbitrate their dispute.”). 
 309. See id. (reversing “the District Court’s order compelling the parties to 
arbitrate”).  
 310. See id. at 213–14 (analyzing DI’s pretrial conduct and concluding that 
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prejudicial to warrant a finding of waiver.311 Similarly, the Third 
Circuit has found waiver where a movant’s ten-month delay and 
extensive depositions, discovery requests, and document 
production requests caused four of the six factors to weigh in 
favor of finding prejudice.312 
b. The Tenth Circuit 
The Tenth Circuit’s waiver test encompasses six factors 
which largely mirror the Third Circuit’s, including whether the 
movant: acted inconsistently with its right to arbitrate; 
substantially invoked the litigation machinery before notifying 
the nonmovant of its intent to arbitrate; either demanded 
arbitration close to trial, or delayed its demand for a long period 
of time; filed a counterclaim without demanding arbitration 
therein; took advantage of pretrial procedures which are 
unavailable in arbitration; and whether its delay “affected, 
misled, or prejudiced ” the nonmovant.313 The court applies these 
factors to supplement three considerations regarding the 
movant’s conduct. First, the court considers the extent to which 
the nonmovant was prejudiced by the movant’s conduct.314 
Prejudice may be shown if the movant inflicted expense, delay, or 
injury to the nonmovant’s legal position.315 Second, the court 
                                                                                                     
“four . . . factors—the untimeliness of DI’s motion, the extent of nonmerits 
motion practice, DI’s assent to the magistrate judge’s pretrial orders, and the 
extent of the parties’ discovery—weigh firmly in favor of a finding of waiver”).  
 311. See id. at 214 (refusing to compel arbitration where DI’s 
“demand . . . came long after the suit commenced and when both parties had 
engaged in extensive discovery” (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted)). 
 312. See Gray Holdco, Inc. v. Cassady, 654 F.3d 444, 454, 458–61 (3d Cir. 
2011) (considering the movant’s “litigation conduct as a whole” and finding that 
its “motion for a preliminary injunction,” ten-month delay, engagement in “three 
pre-trial conferences,” court-ordered mediation, and numerous “discovery 
reports” was sufficient to warrant a finding of waiver).  
 313. See Hill v. Ricoh Ams. Corp., 603 F.3d 766, 772–73 (10th Cir. 2010) 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 314. See id. at 775. 
 315. See id. (stating that the relevant considerations for finding prejudice 
include the “delay and costs” incurred by the nonmovant, and the degree of 
prejudice to the nonmovant’s legal position which “may be inferred from the 
extent of discovery conducted in the case” (internal quotation marks and 
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considers whether the movant is attempting to manipulate the 
judicial process.316 Finally, the court considers whether the 
movant is attempting to hinder the “combined efficiency of the 
public and private dispute-resolution systems.”317 For example, in 
Hill v. Ricoh Americas Corp.,318 the court refused to find waiver 
because Ricoh’s pretrial conduct implicated none of these three 
concerns.319 
In Hill, Hill sued Ricoh Americas Corp. in federal court, 
alleging that he was wrongfully terminated.320 After four months, 
Ricoh moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration 
clause in Hill’s employment contract.321 Applying its factors, the 
Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s finding of waiver on 
three key grounds.322 First, it found that Ricoh’s delay alone was 
insufficient to establish waiver.323 Second, the court found that 
because the trial was five months away and minimal litigation 
activity occurred, granting Ricoh’s motion would neither cause 
inefficiency nor facilitate manipulation.324 Finally, the court 
found that Hill failed to prove prejudice in light of Ricoh’s minor 
delay and pretrial conduct.325 As a result, the court refused to find 
                                                                                                     
citations omitted)).  
 316. See id. at 773 (“An important consideration in assessing waiver is 
whether the party now seeking arbitration is improperly manipulating the 
judicial process.”).  
 317. Id. at 774. 
 318. See id. at 775–76 (applying its six-factor waiver test). 
 319. See id. at 776 (refusing to find waiver because Ricoh’s “minimal 
litigation activity” did not cause prejudice, inefficiency, or “improper 
manipulation of the judicial process”). 
 320. See id. at 769 (noting that Hill filed a claim alleging that he was 
“terminated from his position at Ricoh in violation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act”).  
 321. See id. at 769 n.2 (noting that the arbitration clause required “the 
parties [to] voluntarily agree to settle the dispute by binding arbitration”).  
 322. See id. at 776 (“[T]he circumstances of this case, particularly in light of 
the federal policy favoring arbitration, convince us that the district court should 
not have found waiver . . . .”).  
 323. See id. at 775 (“[L]ength of time in itself does not establish waiver.”).  
 324. See id. (noting that the only important pretrial activities shown on the 
record were “the magistrate judge’s setting the schedule for litigation,” which 
was not to begin for eleven months, and the only discovery conducted was “Hill’s 
request for production of documents”).   
 325. See id. at 775–76 (finding that Hill “failed to show any substantial 
prejudice” in light of Ricoh’s minimal pretrial conduct).  
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waiver.326 In another case, however, the Tenth Circuit found a 
movant’s one year delay; participation in hearings, motions, 
pleadings, and depositions; and failure to demand arbitration 
immediately after the claim was filed sufficiently prejudicial to 
warrant a finding of waiver.327 
c. The Third and Tenth Circuits Compared 
The Third and Tenth Circuits’ waiver analyses encompass 
analogous sets of factors which supplement divergent 
considerations. The Third Circuit’s test amounts to a multifactor 
“prejudice inquiry.”328 Its unitary focus on prejudice could 
potentially aid parties in predicting what degree of pretrial 
conduct might trigger a waiver of arbitral rights. The test’s 
nonexclusive, contextual nature, however, undercuts any such 
potential.329 Thus, although the court recognizes that “arbitration 
is meant to streamline the proceedings, lower costs, and conserve 
private and judicial resources,” it has refused to adopt any 
consistent, doctrinally accurate method to accomplish these 
objectives. 330 
                                                                                                     
 326. See id. at 776 (reversing the district court’s finding of waiver). 
 327. See Reid Burton Constr., Inc. v. Carpenters Dist. Council of S. Colo., 
614 F.2d 698, 703 (10th Cir. 1980) (finding the one-year delay at trial; the 
movant’s “participation in numerous hearings, pretrial conferences, motions and 
other pleadings, and the deposing of witnesses”; and the movant’s failure to 
insist upon arbitration immediately sufficient to warrant a finding of waiver).  
 328. Nino v. Jewelry Exch., Inc., 609 F.3d 191, 208 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 329. See id. at 209 (noting that its list of factors is nonexclusive, “not all the 
factors need be present to justify a finding of waiver, and [t]he waiver 
determination . . . [is] based on the circumstances and context of [a] particular 
case” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); see also Gray Holdco, 
Inc. v. Cassady, 654 F.3d 444, 452 (3d Cir. 2011) (affirming the district court’s 
judgment, but disagreeing with its finding as to how many factors indicated 
prejudice); Quilloin v. Tenet Healthsystem Phila., Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 707, 
721–22 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (refusing to find waiver when three factors weighed in 
favor of finding prejudice and three weighed against finding prejudice, but when 
those in favor were not implicated as strongly); Opalinski v. Robert Half Int’l, 
Inc., No. 10-2069, 2011 WL 4729009, at *1, *7 (D.N.J. Oct. 6, 2011) (refusing to 
find waiver when two factors weighed in favor, one only “slightly” in favor, and 
three against finding prejudice).  
 330. Nino, 609 F.3d at 209.  
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By contrast, the Tenth Circuit’s test encompasses three 
disparate considerations.331 Furthermore, it openly eschews any 
“mechanical” balancing or exhaustive application of its factors.332 
As a result, the Tenth Circuit’s scattershot approach only 
compounds the divergent outcomes engendered by the Third 
Circuit’s regime.333 A uniform, contractual approach, however, 
would instill consistency among the circuits, stability for 
contracting parties, and doctrinal accuracy in accordance with the 
FAA.334 
B. The Minority: Circuits Not Requiring Prejudice 
The Seventh and D.C. Circuits comprise a small minority 
which eschews prejudice as a necessary element of waiver.335 Its 
dissent from the majority, however, has been influential. 
                                                                                                     
 331. See supra notes 314–17 and accompanying text (describing the various 
considerations inherent in the Tenth Circuit’s waiver test).  
 332. See Hill v. Ricoh Ams. Corp., 603 F.3d 766, 773 (10th Cir. 2010) (“Of 
course, our listing these factors . . . was not intended to suggest a mechanical 
process in which each factor is assessed and the side with the greater number of 
factors prevails. Nor were we even suggesting that the list . . . is exclusive.”). 
 333. Compare Lamkin v. Morinda Props. Weight Parcel, LLC, 440 F. App’x 
604, 609 (10th Cir. 2011) (finding that all six factors weighed against finding 
prejudice, but failing to consider whether the movant’s conduct caused 
manipulation of the judicial process or inefficient maintenance of disputes), with 
GVL Pipe & Demolition, Inc. v. Adams Cole & Dalton Rail Serv., LLC, No. CIV-
10-846-M, 2010 WL 4806900, at *1, *3 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 18, 2010) (refusing to 
find waiver when one factor indicated that waiver was appropriate, but 
conflicting with Hill by first engaging in a mechanical balancing of factors 
before considering how those factors indicated prejudice, manipulation, and 
efficiency). There is not a significant amount of case law which addresses waiver 
by conduct subsequent to Hill. However, the opinions cited above, coupled with 
the inconsistencies caused by Third Circuit’s unitary approach, strongly indicate 
that the Tenth Circuit’s multifaceted regime will not yield consistent results.  
 334. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) 
(“The overarching purpose of the FAA . . . is to ensure the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined 
proceedings.”). 
 335. See, e.g., Zuckerman Spaeder, LLP v. Auffenberg, 646 F.3d 919, 923 
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that a party “presumptively forfeit[s]” its right to 
arbitrate if it fails to invoke that right at the “earliest opportunity on the 
record”); Cabinetree of Wis., Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 388, 390 
(7th Cir. 1995) (finding that merely electing to file a claim in court “is a 
presumptive waiver of the right to arbitrate”). 
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Particularly, Judge Posner’s opinion in Cabinetree of Wisconsin, 
Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc.336 is often cited by the majority 
circuits as either the counterpoint to a burdensome prejudice 
requirement337 or by those justifying a lenient prejudice 
standard.338 
1. The Seventh Circuit 
The Seventh Circuit interprets the liberal federal policy 
favoring arbitration agreements as “merely a policy of treating 
such clauses no less hospitably” than other contracts.339 A party 
need not show prejudice to establish waiver.340 Rather, simply 
electing to litigate operates as a “presumptive waiver” of the right 
to arbitrate, which may be rebutted only in “extraordinary 
circumstances.”341 For example, in Cabinetree, the court found 
that a movant waived its right to arbitrate by proceeding 
judicially rather than demanding arbitration at the outset of the 
dispute.342 
In Cabinetree, Cabinetree filed suit against Kraftmaid in 
state court, alleging breach of contract.343 Shortly thereafter, 
Kraftmaid removed the case to federal court and, six months 
                                                                                                     
 336. See Cabinetree, 50 F.3d at 391 (finding that a party waived its right to 
arbitrate by electing to “proceed in a judicial forum,” rather than demanding 
arbitration at the outset of the dispute). 
 337. See, e.g., Joseph Chris Pers. Servs., Inc. v. Rossi, 249 F. App’x 988, 993 
(5th Cir. 2007) (citing Cabinetree as propounding a view of prejudice contrary to 
its own); Leadertex, Inc. v. Morgantown Dyeing & Finishing Corp., 67 F.3d 20, 
26 (2d Cir. 1995) (disagreeing with Cabinetree and refusing to find waiver 
without first finding prejudice). 
 338. See, e.g., Hooper v. Advance Am., Cash Advance Ctrs. of Mo., Inc., 589 
F.3d 917, 923 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing Cabinetree to support its lenient prejudice 
requirement); Rankin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 336 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 2003) (citing 
Cabinetree for the notion that arbitration should “be invoked at the earliest 
opportunity”). 
 339. Cabinetree, 50 F.3d at 390. 
 340. See id. (finding that “a party need not show that it would be prejudiced 
if [a] stay were granted and arbitration ensued” in order to establish waiver).  
 341. Id. at 390–91.  
 342. See id. at 391 (affirming the district court’s finding of waiver).  
 343. See id. at 389 (noting that Cabinetree brought a “breach of contract 
suit . . . in Wisconsin state court against Kraftmaid” ). 
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later, moved to compel arbitration.344 On appeal, the Seventh 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding of waiver, reasoning 
that Kraftmaid failed to rebut the presumption that it waived its 
right to arbitrate.345 The court found Kraftmaid’s explanation for 
its removal and subsequent pretrial activity—that it needed 
“time to weigh its options,”—the “worst possible reason for 
delay.”346 Rather, it found that parties must select a forum in 
which to resolve their disputes at the earliest opportunity.347 
Therefore, merely electing to proceed judicially is considered 
“powerful evidence” that the parties agreed to forego 
arbitration.348 In a subsequent case, the Seventh Circuit found 
that the movant did not trigger the presumption of waiver when 
it removed the dispute to federal court six weeks after the 
complaint was filed; demanded arbitration thirty days after 
removal; and refrained from engaging in pretrial conduct before 
demanding arbitration.349 
2. The D.C. Circuit 
Similarly, the D.C. Circuit recently adopted a bright-line 
approach to determine whether a party has lost its right to 
arbitrate through pretrial conduct.350 In Zuckerman Spaeder, 
LLP v. Auffenberg,351 the court found that a movant who fails to 
                                                                                                     
 344. See id. (noting that six months after removal, Kraftmaid “moved the 
district court under 9 U.S.C. § 3 to stay further proceedings pending arbitration 
of the parties’ dispute”). 
 345. See id. at 391 (“The presumption that an election to proceed judicially 
constitutes a waiver of the right to arbitrate has not been rebutted.”).  
 346. Id. 
 347. See id. (“Selection of a forum in which to resolve a legal dispute should 
be made at the earliest possible opportunity . . . .”). 
 348. Id. 
 349. See Halim v. Great Gatsby’s Auction Gallery, Inc., 516 F.3d 557, 562 
(7th Cir. 2008) (discussing the movant’s conduct and affirming the district 
court’s refusal to find waiver). 
 350. Zuckerman Spaeder, LLP v. Auffenberg, 646 F.3d 919, 922 (D.C. Cir. 
2011) (stating that, in considering whether a movant has lost its right to 
arbitrate through pretrial conduct, the court has “established a few bright-line 
rules”).  
 351. See id. at 922–23 (adopting a new standard for determining whether a 
party has lost its right to arbitrate through pretrial conduct).  
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invoke arbitration “on the record at the first available 
opportunity . . . presumptively forfeit[s]” its right to arbitrate.352 
Thus, the court replaced the waiver doctrine with forfeiture, 
reasoning that intent is irrelevant for determining whether a 
party has lost its right to arbitrate through pretrial conduct.353 
Rather, simply failing to demand arbitration in a timely manner 
will trigger forfeiture.354 To be timely, the movant’s demand must 
come in its “first responsive pleading or motion to dismiss.”355 If 
the movant fails this requirement, it may still access the arbitral 
forum if it proves that its delay did not prejudice the opponent or 
the court.356 Only a minimal amount of undue expense or delay 
need be shown to establish prejudice.357 Applying this standard, 
the Auffenberg court found that Auffenberg forfeited his right to 
arbitrate.358 
In Auffenberg, Zuckerman filed claims against Auffenberg in 
the D.C. Superior Court for unpaid attorneys’ fees.359 Auffenberg 
subsequently removed the case to federal court, answered 
Zuckerman’s complaint, and filed counterclaims.360 After several 
months of engaging in pretrial motions and court-ordered 
mediation, Auffenberg moved to compel arbitration.361 The D.C. 
                                                                                                     
 352. Id. at 922. 
 353. See id. (abandoning waiver, which “refers to a party’s intentional 
relinquishment . . . of a known right,” and adopting forfeiture, which simply 
refers to a “failure to make a timely assertion of a right” (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted)). 
 354. See id. (finding that “forfeiture, not waiver, is the appropriate 
standard”).  
 355. Id.  
 356. See id. at 923 (“A defendant who delays seeking a stay pending 
arbitration until after his first available opportunity might still prevail on a 
later stay motion provided his delay did not prejudice his opponent or the 
court.”).  
 357. See id. (allowing access to arbitration only if a movant’s delay inflicts 
“no or little cost upon opposing counsel and the courts”).  
 358. See id. (affirming the district court and finding that Auffenberg 
forfeited its right to arbitrate).  
 359. See id. at 920 (noting that “Zuckerman sued Auffenberg in the District 
of Columbia Superior Court to recover the [attorneys’] fees plus interest”).  
 360. See id. (“Auffenberg removed the case to federal court, answered the 
complaint, and counterclaimed for legal malpractice.”).  
 361. See id. at 921 (noting that “a client may invoke mandatory arbitration 
of any fee dispute” with its lawyer under “D.C. Bar Rule XIII”). 
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Circuit affirmed the district court’s refusal to grant Auffenberg’s 
motion on two key grounds.362 First, it found Auffenberg’s failure 
to demand arbitration in his original answer sufficient to invoke 
the presumption of forfeiture.363 Second, the court found that 
Auffenberg’s pretrial conduct “imposed substantial costs upon 
both Zuckerman and the district court.”364 Particularly, 
Zuckerman was forced to conduct internal investigations, engage 
in discovery, and prepare depositions.365 Auffenberg’s conduct 
also consumed “inherently limited” judicial resources, including 
the court’s time.366 Ultimately, because the court found 
Auffenberg’s conduct prejudicial, it concluded that he failed to 
rebut the presumption of forfeiture.367 
3. The Seventh and D.C. Circuits Compared 
Notably, both the Seventh and the D.C. Circuits have broken 
with the majority to facilitate doctrinal accuracy. The Seventh 
Circuit refuses to require prejudice on contractual grounds, 
noting that prejudice is not required to find waiver under 
contract law.368 Similarly, the D.C. Circuit repudiated the waiver 
doctrine in favor of forfeiture in order to “realign litigants’ 
incentives . . . with the FAA.”369 Finally, both circuits seek to 
prevent dilatory, manipulative strategies that impose 
unnecessary costs on both nonmovants and the judicial system.370 
                                                                                                     
 362. See id. at 923.  
 363. See id. (finding Auffenberg’s failure “to invoke arbitration in (or before 
filing) his original answer” sufficient to trigger the presumption of forfeiture).  
 364. Id.  
 365. See id. (“Zuckerman . . . had commenced an internal investigation, 
responded to and filed discovery requests, and begun preparing for 
depositions . . . .”).  
 366. Id.  
 367. See id. (affirming the “district court’s denial of the stay”).  
 368. See Cabinetree of Wis., Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 388, 
390 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that, under contract law, waiver is “normally 
effective without . . . detrimental reliance,” or prejudice (citing E. ALLAN 
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 8.5 (2d ed. 1990))).  
 369. Zuckerman Spaeder, LLP v. Auffenberg, 646 F.3d 919, 924 (D.C. Cir. 
2011). 
 370. See id. at 922 (recognizing that its failure to articulate a concrete 
standard encouraged dilatory, strategic lawsuits that “imposed . . . cost[s] upon 
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Yet, although their analyses have moved toward alignment with 
the FAA, the efficacy of each circuit’s presumptive regime is 
questionable. Particularly, the Seventh Circuit has failed to 
uphold its presumption consistently since Cabinetree, allowing 
movants to affect rebuttal in divergent371 and even manipulative 
factual circumstances.372 This Note, however, proposes a uniform 
framework which would instill consistency and prevent 
unscrupulous pretrial conduct.373  
IV. “Waiving” the Right to Arbitrate: A Contractual Approach 
A. The Need for a Uniform Standard 
The divergent, ill-defined waiver standards propagated by 
the Circuit Courts of Appeals present three significant problems. 
First, their juridical inconsistencies deny contracting parties the 
                                                                                                     
both litigants and the district court[s]”); Cabinetree, 50 F.3d at 391 (introducing 
a presumption of waiver in order to “economize on the resources, both public and 
private, consumed in dispute resolution” by stifling dilatory “heads I win, tails 
you lose” strategies).  
 371. Compare Sharif v. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd., 376 F.3d 720, 722–23 
(7th Cir. 2004) (refusing to find waiver when the movant delayed for nine 
months before moving to compel arbitration, and filed motions to dismiss on the 
merits and for improper venue, which were “briefed fully” in the district court), 
and Benjamin-Coleman v. Praxair, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d 750, 752, 754 (N.D. Ill. 
2002) (refusing to find waiver where the movant delayed for four months, during 
which time it filed three merits-based motions to dismiss), with Grumhaus v. 
Comerica Sec., Inc., 223 F.3d 648, 651 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding waiver after a 
movant delayed demanding arbitration for one year after its complaint was filed 
and, subsequently, dismissed), and Pa. Chiropractic Ass’n v. Blue Cross Blue 
Shield Ass’n, No. 09 C 5619, 2011 WL 210805, at *1, *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 20, 2011) 
(finding waiver where the movants delayed for eight months and filed three 
motions to dismiss).  
 372. See N. Cent. Constr., Inc. v. Siouxland Energy & Livestock Coop., 232 
F. Supp. 2d 959, 968 (N.D. Iowa 2002) (refusing to find waiver, yet 
acknowledging that the movant may have engaged in a “limited form of forum 
shopping” by delaying its demand for arbitration); Benjamin-Coleman, 216 F. 
Supp. 2d at 753 (refusing to find waiver although the movant engaged in a 
“limited form of forum shopping, which the waiver doctrine is designed to 
prevent”).  
 373. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) 
(“The overarching purpose of the FAA . . . is to ensure the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined 
proceedings.”). 
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predictability that they expect through bargained-for arbitral 
procedures, thus destabilizing the arbitral process.374 For 
example, parties subjected to onerous prejudice requirements375 
often spend months consuming judicial and personal resources 
pretrial, only to be forced to arbitrate according to procedures 
that have lost their initial value.376 The minority’s presumptive 
regime proves similarly unavailing, as it merely shifts the 
unpredictability post hoc towards rebuttal.377 
Second, the waiver doctrine contravenes the FAA’s 
overarching objective: to “ensure the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate 
streamlined proceedings.”378 Indeed, the two goals inherent 
within this objective—contractual enforcement and facilitation of 
streamlined proceedings—should coincide.379 As to the former, 
the FAA reflects the fundamental notion that arbitration 
agreements, as contracts, should be enforced in accordance with 
parties’ legitimate expectations.380 The circuits, however, often 
subordinate these expectations in the name of the oft-cited 
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.381 Unfortunately, 
this reasoning misconstrues the policy’s true objective—to ensure 
the “enforcement of private contractual arrangements” according 
                                                                                                     
 374. See supra Part III (discussing the inconsistencies among the circuits 
regarding proper waiver standard). 
 375. See supra Part III (describing a number of circuits which impose 
burdensome prejudice requirements in their waiver analyses). 
 376. See Zuckerman Spaeder, LLP v. Auffenberg, 646 F.3d 919, 922 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011) (describing the costs imposed on both litigants and the courts in the 
absence of a clear standard); Rankin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 336 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 
2003) (noting the importance of choosing between arbitration and litigation 
early in the dispute resolution process to avoid the needless deployment of both 
individual and judicial resources). 
 377. See supra note 371 and accompanying text (describing the doctrinal 
inconsistencies permeating the Seventh Circuit since Cabinetree). 
 378. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011). 
 379. See id. at 1749 (alluding to the notion that, where possible, the FAA’s 
underlying goals should not conflict). 
 380. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing the FAA’s 
contractual goal of enforcing arbitration agreements in accordance with parties’ 
legitimate expectations).  
 381. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 
24 (1983); supra Part III (discussing numerous cases in which courts justify 
their respective waiver analyses by citing the liberal federal policy favoring 
arbitration agreements). 
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to their terms.382 Indeed, it merely reflects FAA § 2’s substantive 
mandate,383 which “requires courts to honor parties’ 
expectations.”384 Thus, the ill-defined waiver and rebuttal 
standards imposed by the circuits clearly fail this requirement 
because both undercut the key benefits that parties expect to 
derive through bargained-for arbitral procedures—predictability 
and stability.385 
Further, requiring parties to prove either prejudice or 
rebuttal inhibits procedural efficiency—the FAA’s second 
underlying goal. Indeed, the Supreme Court has eschewed 
burdensome procedural obstacles that impede a clear path to the 
arbitral forum. For example, the Court has refused to require 
parties to obtain an order compelling arbitration in federal court 
after securing a stay of judicial proceedings in state court.386 
Similarly, the Court has invalidated state laws requiring 
administrative exhaustion before granting access to 
arbitration.387 To be sure, strong prejudice requirements ensure 
that parties’ arbitral rights will be enforced much deeper into the 
pretrial process. Long delays, however, contravene “Congress’s 
intent to move the parties . . . out of court and into arbitration as 
quickly and easily as possible.”388 Indeed, requiring endless 
                                                                                                     
 382. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 
625 (1985) (emphasis added); see Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 
U.S. 440, 443 (2006) (stating that FAA § 2 “embodies the national policy 
favoring arbitration and places arbitration agreements on equal footing with all 
other contracts” (emphasis added) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2011))). 
 383. See Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24 (stating that FAA § 2 is “a 
congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration 
agreements”). 
 384. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1752 (2011). 
 385. See supra Part II (discussing the benefits derived through arbitration).  
 386. See Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 27 (noting that a movant who first 
obtained a stay in state court “would have no sure way to proceed with its 
claims [in arbitration] except to return to federal court to obtain a § 4 order—a 
pointless and wasteful burden on the supposedly summary and speedy 
procedures prescribed by the Arbitration Act”). 
 387. See Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 347 (2008) (finding that state-
mandated administrative exhaustion conflicts with the FAA’s mandate to 
facilitate expedient access to the arbitral forum); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson 
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28–29 (1991) (“[T]he mere involvement of an 
administrative agency in the enforcement of a statute is not sufficient to 
preclude arbitration.”). 
 388. Preston, 552 U.S. at 327 (internal quotation marks and citations 
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litigation over the details of prejudice,389 or rebuttal,390 flouts the 
judiciary’s responsibility to facilitate expedient access to the 
arbitral forum.391  
Finally, parties face the distinct possibility that their arbitral 
rights will be turned against them to inflict undue delay and 
expense.392 Indeed, arbitration agreements designed to protect 
parties’ interests may turn from a shield to a sword in the hands 
of recalcitrant parties whose contractual relationships have gone 
awry.393 Such conduct inflicts unnecessary costs on both parties 
and the judicial system.394 Furthermore, it strips the arbitral 
process of any predictability, destabilizing parties’ contractually 
established dispute resolution mechanisms.395 The circuits 
                                                                                                     
omitted). 
 389. See Erdman Co. v. Phoenix Land & Acquisition, LLC, 650 F.3d 1115, 
1120 (8th Cir. 2011) (finding that requiring parties “to litigate endlessly over the 
details of prejudice” makes little sense in certain circumstances). 
 390. See North Cent. Constr., Inc. v. Siouxland Energy & Livestock Coop., 
232 F. Supp. 2d 959, 969 (N.D. Iowa 2002) (recognizing that its finding of waiver 
would be sanctioning a less efficient means of resolving disputes, but that 
“neither efficiency nor judicial economy is the primary goal behind the” FAA 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Benjamin-Coleman v. 
Praxair, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d 750, 754 (N.D. Ill 2002) (same). 
 391. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 
29 (1983) (stating that, through the FAA, Congress required “summary and 
speedy disposition of motions [and] petitions to enforce arbitration clauses”). 
 392. See, e.g., Leadertex, Inc. v. Morganton Dyeing & Finishing Corp., 67 
F.3d 20, 26 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that no matter how “unjustifiable” a movant’s 
conduct, it would not find waiver without first finding prejudice); Menorah Ins. 
Co., Ltd. v. INX Reinsurance Corp., 72 F.3d 218, 222–23 (1st Cir. 1995) (noting 
the tendency of parties to use arbitration clauses to manipulate the dispute 
resolution process); Walker v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 938 F.2d 575, 577 (5th Cir. 
1991) (recognizing the movant’s delay and attempts to forum shop, but refusing 
to find waiver). 
 393. See, e.g., Cabinetree of Wis., Inc., v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 
388, 391 (7th Cir. 1995) (refusing to find waiver where a party sought to “play 
heads I win, tails you lose” by seeing “how the case was going in federal district 
court before deciding whether it would be better off there or in arbitration”). 
 394. See id. (“Selection of a forum in which to resolve a legal dispute should 
be made at the earliest possible opportunity in order to economize on the 
resources, both public and private, consumed in dispute resolution.”); see also 
Rankin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 336 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 2003) (requiring that 
arbitration be “invoked at the earliest opportunity” so that courts’ and parties’ 
“resources are not needlessly deployed”). 
 395. See supra Part II (describing the benefits parties seek through 
arbitration).  
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reluctantly condone such conduct, citing the liberal federal policy 
favoring arbitration as if their hands are tied.396 This Note 
proposes, however, that they are not so bound. A contractual 
approach would prevent unscrupulous strategies employed by 
obstinate parties in accordance with the FAA’s text and 
overarching objective.397 Before discussing this approach, 
however, it is important to note the fundamental doctrinal 
inaccuracies of applying the waiver doctrine, as prescribed by 
contract law, in the context of parties’ arbitral rights. 
B. “Waiver” as a Generally Applicable Contract Law Defense 
Recall that waiver by conduct implicates the obligation to 
arbitrate.398 Therefore, it is a gateway issue that must be resolved 
by the courts in accordance with contract law.399 In this regard, 
the waiver doctrine’s legitimacy should be tested against the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts. Applying the Restatement 
would comply with the FAA,400 as it sets the general conceptual 
                                                                                                     
 396. See, e.g., MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Lauricia, 268 F.3d 244, 254 (4th Cir. 
2001) (refusing to find waiver under the liberal federal policy favoring 
arbitration, but recognizing that the movant’s “aggressive” course of litigation 
was seemingly taken to wear the nonmovant out “both emotionally and 
financially”); Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 779 F.2d 885, 889–91 (2d Cir. 1985) 
(citing the liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements in refusing to 
find waiver where a movant demanded arbitration only after it lost a merits-
based motion to dismiss in court); North Cent. Constr., Inc. v. Siouxland Energy 
& Livestock Coop., 232 F. Supp. 2d 959, 968 (N.D. Iowa 2002) (citing the liberal 
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements and refusing to find waiver, even 
after acknowledging that the movant’s conduct constituted “a limited form of 
forum shopping”); Benjamin-Coleman v. Praxair, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d 750, 753 
(N.D. Ill. 2002) (refusing to find waiver due to the liberal federal policy favoring 
arbitration agreements, even after acknowledging that the movant engaged in 
forum shopping as exhibited by its pretrial activity).  
 397. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) 
(“The overarching purpose of the FAA . . . is to ensure the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined 
proceedings.”). 
 398. See supra Part II (discussing the connection between conduct-based 
waiver, severability, and contract law). 
 399. See supra Part II (discussing how gateway issues must be decided by 
the courts in accordance with contract law). 
 400. See, e.g., Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) 
(stating that, under FAA § 2, arbitration agreements may by validated only by 
“generally applicable contract defenses”).  
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foundation upon which states have constructed their contract 
law.401  
Under the Restatement, waiver occurs when a party 
promises to perform a conditional duty under an antecedent 
contract, despite the condition’s nonoccurrence.402 A condition is 
“an event, not certain to occur, which must occur . . . before 
performance [of one’s duty] under a contract becomes due.”403 
Thus, a party that waives a condition precedent to its duty to 
perform a contractual obligation must still perform that duty, 
even if the condition has not occurred.  
A critical corollary to the waiver doctrine, however, is that a 
condition’s occurrence must not be “a material part of the agreed 
exchange for the performance of the duty.”404 Thus, the waiver 
doctrine presumes that a condition is being waived, not a 
contract, and that the condition was not a material part of the 
underlying agreement. For example, if Promisor contracts to sell 
her car to Promisee in exchange for $500, Promisor need not 
tender the car until Promisee tenders the money.405 Promisor 
cannot waive the purchase price, however, because she cannot 
waive a condition that materially affects the value to be received 
under the contract—payment in exchange for her car.406 
                                                                                                     
 401. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Ingredients in the Redaction of the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 (1981) (noting that the 
drafters of the Restatement felt “obliged in [their] deliberations to give weight to 
all of the considerations that the courts, under a proper view of the judicial 
function, deem it right to weigh in theirs” (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted)); Herbert Wechsler, The Course of Restatements, 55 A.B.A. J. 
147, 147 (1969) (stating that restatements generally have “enormous influence 
on the development of our law”). 
 402. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 84(1) (1981) (“[A] promise 
to perform all or part of a conditional duty under an antecedent contract in spite 
of the non-occurrence of the condition is binding, whether the promise is made 
before or after the time for the condition to occur . . . .”). 
 403. Id. § 224.  
 404. Id. § 84(1)(a). 
 405. See id. § 84 cmt. c (noting that in a contractual arrangement to “sell a 
horse for $500,” a “waiver of the price of a horse is not within this Section” and, 
thus, is not waiver).  
 406. See id. (“[W]here a promise to disregard the nonoccurrence of the 
condition materially affects the value received by the promisor . . . the promise 
[to waive the condition] is not binding . . . .”). 
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Drawing from the Restatement, it is clear that the circuits’ 
analyses fundamentally conflict with contract law and, as such, 
the FAA. First, under the severability doctrine, an arbitration 
clause is neither immaterial, nor a condition precedent to 
performance of the underlying contract. Rather, when pretrial 
conduct implicates the obligation to arbitrate,407 the severability 
doctrine separates the arbitration clause from the underlying 
agreement.408 This severance results in a wholly autonomous 
arbitration clause, fully enforceable in accordance with generally 
applicable contract law principles.409 It therefore becomes clear, 
under the Restatement, that a party can neither waive an 
independent arbitration agreement nor the sole material benefit 
derived from that agreement—access to the arbitral forum.410 
Furthermore, neither prejudice nor rebuttal is necessary to 
establish waiver under contract law.411  
Ultimately, waiver cannot be the proper standard for 
determining whether a party has lost its right to arbitrate 
through pretrial conduct. The Supreme Court has interpreted 
FAA § 3, from which the waiver doctrine was derived, as purely 
procedural.412 It does not alter “background principles of state 
contract law” in enforcing obligations to arbitrate under § 2.413 
Thus, as both the majority and the minority’s standards alter the 
waiver doctrine as prescribed by contract law, they clearly 
contravene the FAA. In this regard, the D.C. Circuit’s forfeiture 
standard proves equally unavailing. The Restatement limits 
forfeiture to circumstances in which the “occurrence of the 
                                                                                                     
 407. See supra note 161 and accompanying text (discussing how issues 
concerning waiver, as a gateway issue, must be considered under the auspices of 
contract law).  
 408. See supra Part II (discussing the severability doctrine).  
 409. See supra Part II (describing how FAA § 2 requires the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements as contracts).  
 410. See supra notes 404–06 and accompanying text (discussing how, under 
contract law, a party cannot waive a contract or the material value for which it 
bargained).   
 411. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 84 cmt. b (1981) (stating 
when “waiver is reinforced by [detrimental] reliance, enforcement is often said 
to rest on estoppel,” not waiver).  
 412. See supra note 153 and accompanying text (discussing the origins of the 
waiver doctrine).  
 413. Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896, 1902 (2009). 
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condition [is] not a material part of the agreed exchange.”414 
Therefore, forfeiture falls prey to the same conceptual barriers as 
waiver. Indeed, an entirely new contractual framework must be 
devised in order to realign the circuits’ analyses with one 
another, and with the FAA. 
V. The Proposal 
A. A Contractual Approach 
This Note proposes a comprehensive contractual solution 
through a succinct judicial framework to discern whether a party 
has lost its right to arbitrate through pretrial conduct. The 
reasonableness test comprises the core of this solution and 
requires courts to discern what constitutes a reasonable time to 
demand arbitration.415 First, this Note identifies the key 
contractual components which drive the operative function of 
arbitration agreements and, through those components, sets the 
proper standard. Next, this Note proposes a multifactor 
reasonableness test to determine whether a party demanded 
arbitration within a reasonable time after engaging in pretrial 
conduct. Finally, this Note employs a useful hypothetical, based 
on the Fourth Circuit’s decision in MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Lauricia, 
to illustrate the efficacy of this approach.416 
1. The Groundwork: A Duty to Arbitrate Subject to Conditions 
The reasonableness test begins with the premise that an 
arbitration clause is an autonomous contract, the performance of 
which hinges upon the occurrence of “constructive (or ‘implied in 
law’)” conditions.417 The FAA does not impose an affirmative duty 
                                                                                                     
 414. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 229 cmt. c (1981) (emphasis 
added). 
 415. See Zev v. Merman, 533 N.E.2d 669, 669 (N.Y. 1988) (noting that courts 
must determine “[w]hat constitutes a reasonable time for performance” on a 
“case-by-case basis”).  
 416. See supra Part II (discussing the Fourth Circuit’s decision in 
MicroStrategy, which was decided under a burdensome prejudice requirement).  
 417. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 226 cmt. c (1981). 
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to demand arbitration under a private agreement once a dispute 
arises. Rather, given parties’ ability to stay judicial proceedings 
under § 3,418 the FAA provides parties the opportunity to resolve 
their disputes through different mediums before resorting to 
arbitration (i.e., mediation, negotiation, or litigation).419 
Therefore, each party’s respective duty to arbitrate is conditioned 
upon the other’s demand. If neither party invokes its right to 
arbitrate, then neither party’s duty to arbitrate becomes due.420 
In contract law, this nonoccurrence eventually discharges each 
party’s duty to perform its contractual obligation, i.e., to 
arbitrate, “when the condition can no longer occur.”421 Thus, the 
discharge principle provides a conceptually accurate contract law 
defense for parties attempting to avoid arbitration after litigation 
has commenced.  
Providing a defense, however, does not end the inquiry. The 
presence of FAA § 3 and the pervasiveness of the liberal federal 
policy favoring arbitration beg the question: At what point in the 
pretrial process does a party’s duty to arbitrate become 
discharged? Under contract law, it is first essential to consider 
the language of the parties’ arbitration agreement.422 If the 
parties specified time limits on their right to demand arbitration, 
that should certainly end the inquiry. The Supreme Court, 
however, has recently found that procedural issues, such as time 
                                                                                                     
 418. See 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2011) (providing parties to an otherwise enforceable 
arbitration agreement the opportunity to stay judicial proceedings pending 
arbitration). 
 419. See, e.g., Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896, 1901–02 
(2009) (“Section 3 . . . allows litigants already in federal court to invoke 
agreements made enforceable by § 2.”); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin 
Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967) (noting the “unmistakably clear congressional 
purpose” that arbitration be facilitated by the courts “when selected by the 
parties”). 
 420. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 225(1) (1981) (“Performance 
of a duty subject to a condition cannot become due unless the condition 
occurs . . . .”). 
 421. Id. § 225(2). 
 422. See, e.g., Richard D. Brown & Mara E. Fortin, An Introduction to 
Interpretation of Express Contractual Indemnity Provisions in Construction 
Contracts Under California and Nevada Law, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1019, 1021 
(2001) (stating that, under general “rules governing contract 
interpretation . . . . courts will first look to the ‘plan language’” of the contract in 
order “to ascertain the parties’ intent”).  
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limits, are presumptively for arbitrators to decide.423 By contrast, 
disputes regarding “whether the parties are bound by a given 
arbitration clause” are for the courts to decide.424 The circuits 
have largely interpreted this decision as leaving conduct-based 
waiver within the courts’ purview.425 
Consequently, however, judges will not have recourse to 
concrete time limits in parties’ arbitration agreements for 
determining discharge. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that 
parties would bargain for procedural contingencies in case of 
litigation while attempting to establish proper arbitral 
procedures. Such uncertainty presents a significant quandary for 
courts because one party must demand arbitration at some point 
in order to trigger its opponent’s duty to arbitrate. The 
Restatement, however, provides that in the absence of a “fixed 
term” in the parties’ agreement setting “[t]he time within which 
the condition can occur,”426 a term “which is reasonable in the 
circumstances is supplied by the court.”427 Thus, to facilitate the 
arbitral process, “a term calling for performance within a 
reasonable time” should be “supplied.”428 
2. The Reasonableness Test: What Constitutes a “Reasonable 
Time” for Performance? 
An inherently fact-based analysis, standards for determining 
what constitutes a reasonable time for performance vary not only 
from state to state, but also case by case.429 New York courts, 
                                                                                                     
 423. See Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 85 (2002) 
(“[W]e find that the applicability of the . . . time limit rule is a matter 
presumptively for the arbitrator, not the judge.”). 
 424. Id. at 84.  
 425. See supra note 156 and accompanying text (citing and describing the 
numerous circuit court decisions which hold waiver by conduct an issue for the 
courts to decide).   
 426. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 225 cmt. a (1981).  
 427. Id. § 204. 
 428. Id. § 204 cmt. d. 
 429. See Zev v. Merman, 533 N.E.2d 669, 669 (N.Y. 1988) (“What constitutes 
a reasonable time for performance depends upon the facts and circumstances of 
the particular case.”); see also 1700 Rhinehart LLC v. Advance Am., 51 So.3d 
535, 540 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (“[W]hen a contract fails to specify a 
particular period, the law implies a reasonable time under the circumstances.”); 
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however, have compiled a comprehensive list of factors in order to 
provide a uniform, predicable approach to this inquiry.430 
Particularly, the courts consider “the nature and object of the 
contract, the previous conduct of the parties, the presence or 
absence of good faith,” and the “possibility of prejudice or 
hardship” to either party.431 
First, the courts contemplate the nature and the object of the 
contract in question by looking to its operative purpose, including 
“all of the rules and procedures thereunder.”432 For example, the 
delayed provision of “ministerial” services which bear little 
significance on a party’s operations433 will be found much more 
reasonable than delayed payments of property taxes required 
under an option contract to purchase real property.434 Second, 
courts will look to the parties’ prior conduct in order to determine 
whether they were fulfilling their “contractual duties as 
intended.”435 For example, one court found a two-week closing 
period, set abruptly by a seller of real property after it delayed 
closing for five years, unreasonable.436 Critical to its finding was 
                                                                                                     
German v. Ford, 300 S.W.3d 692, 706 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) (“The court will 
usually imply a term requiring performance within a reasonable time under the 
circumstances.”); O’Farrill Avila v. Gonzalez, 974 S.W.2d 237, 245 (Tex. App. 
1998) (“Upon finding an essential term is missing, the trial judge, in implying 
that term, is only to consider what was reasonable to the parties in light of the 
circumstances . . . .”). 
 430. See Zev, 533 N.E.2d at 669. 
 431. Id.  
 432. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., Inc. v. Liechtensteinische 
Landesbank, 866 F. Supp. 114, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (considering the “deposit 
rejection procedure” under the parties’ agreement); see Schober v. Hudson 
Valley Humane Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, Inc., 933 N.Y.S.2d 
58, 59 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (considering “the unambiguous terms of the 
stipulation settlement” between the parties); Bilotto v. Webber, 568 N.Y.S.2d 
438, 439 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (considering the terms of a construction contract 
between a builder and homeowners). 
 433. Smith Barney, 866 F. Supp. at 117. 
 434. See Parker v. Booker, 822 N.Y.S.2d 156, 158 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) 
(“Since real property taxes by their nature are due on a particular day, the 
reasonable date on which they were required to be paid is the date on which 
they were due.”). 
 435. Smith Barney, 866 F. Supp. at 118. 
 436. See Knight v. McClean, 566 N.Y.S.2d 952, 954 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) 
(describing the seller’s conduct which made the time that it set for performance 
unreasonable).  
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that the seller’s actions exhibited nothing more than a “desire to 
avoid” performance of the contract as the parties intended.437  
Third, courts consider the extent to which each party 
performed its contractual obligations in good faith; that is, 
whether each is acting in “consideration” of the other’s 
interests.438 Indeed, a “covenant of good faith and fair dealing is 
implied in all contracts,”439 and its meaning varies with the 
circumstances.440 Generally, however, “good faith 
performance . . . emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common 
purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the 
other party.”441 Although particular acts of bad faith vary, two 
notable instances are evading the “spirit” of the bargain and 
willfully rendering “imperfect performance.”442 In the arbitral 
context, for example, one court ordered a labor union to arbitrate 
with an employer pursuant to an arbitration clause in the parties’ 
collective bargaining agreement.443 When the union attempted to 
contest the tribunal’s jurisdiction, the court stated that parties to 
an arbitration agreement “must live up to the spirit of their 
agreement.”444 They “will not be permitted to take refuge in 
subtle and adroit evasions in order to defeat the purposes of the 
agreement.”445  
Finally, the reasonableness inquiry will be affected by the 
extent to which the delay in question prejudiced each party.446 
For example, when a finding of unreasonable delay would cause 
                                                                                                     
 437. Id.  
 438. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., Inc. v. Liechtensteinische 
Landesbank, 866 F. Supp. 114, 118 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).  
 439. Smith v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co., 697 N.E.2d 168, 170 (N.Y. 1998). 
 440. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981) (“The 
phrase ‘good faith’ is used in a variety of contexts, and its meaning varies 
somewhat with the context.”). 
 441. Id.  
 442. Id. § 205 cmt. d. 
 443. Publishers’ Ass’n of N.Y. City v. N.Y. Newspaper Printing Pressmen’s 
Union No. Two, 145 N.Y.S.2d 93, 96 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955) (noting that the union 
contested the arbitrators’ jurisdiction “because the [employee’s] 
grievance . . . was ambiguous”).  
 444. Id. at 96. 
 445. Id. at 97. 
 446. See Zev v. Merman, 533 N.E.2d 669, 669 (N.Y. 1988) (noting prejudice 
as a part of the multifactor reasonableness test).  
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one party to suffer substantial losses while benefitting the other, 
a court will be much less likely to find the delay unreasonable.447 
Ultimately, New York’s reasonableness analysis provides a 
stable, yet flexible framework to determine whether a party has 
demanded arbitration within a reasonable time. Not all of the 
factors need weigh in favor of unreasonableness to warrant such 
a finding, and a strong implication of one factor often implicates 
another.448 Furthermore, the test’s flexibility renders it applicable 
to a myriad of contractual arrangements and circumstances.449 
Therefore, this Note proposes that federal courts abandon the 
waiver–forfeiture doctrine, and incorporate instead, through FAA 
§ 2, New York courts’ multifactor approach as a reasonableness 
test.450 Doing so will establish a uniform, predictable, doctrinally 
accurate method to determine whether a party has lost its right 
to arbitrate through pretrial conduct.  
                                                                                                     
 447. See Miller v. Almquist, 671 N.Y.S.2d 746, 750 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) 
(refusing to find unreasonable delay where the buyers would have lost “their 
opportunity to purchase” an apartment and their “$54,000 deposit,” while the 
sellers would “have received the all-cash deal they had bargained for”). 
 448. See, e.g., Malley v. Malley, 861 N.Y.S.2d 149, 152 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) 
(finding that the defendant was given an unreasonable time in which to perform 
where a finding of reasonableness would have left the plaintiff’s “financial 
position . . . the same,” but prejudiced the defendant severely); Parker v. Booker, 
822 N.Y.S.2d 156, 158 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (finding unreasonable delay but no 
bad faith); Knight v. McClean, 566 N.Y.S.2d 952, 954 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) 
(finding that buyers were presented with an unreasonable time to perform 
where “the previous conduct of the parties” was “[o]f significant importance”). 
 449. See, e.g., Malley, 861 N.Y.S.2d at 152 (applying the reasonableness test 
to a real estate agreement entered as part of a judgment of divorce); Smith 
Barney, Harris Upham & Co., Inc. v. Liechtensteinische Landesbank, 866 F. 
Supp. 114, 118 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (applying the reasonableness test to an 
agreement established to “facilitate the settlement of securities transactions”); 
Schober v. Hudson Valley Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, Inc., 89 
A.D.3d 715, 716 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (applying the reasonableness test to a 
stipulation agreement entered in lieu of foreclosure). 
 450. See Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896, 1901 (2009) 
(stating that FAA § 2 “creates substantive federal law regarding the 
enforceability of arbitration agreements,” in which traditional state principles of 
contract law govern the analysis). 
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3. A “Reasonable Time” to Demand Arbitration: 
MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Lauricia 
The Fourth Circuit’s decision in MicroStrategy, Inc. v. 
Lauricia presents a useful paradigm to illustrate the efficacy of 
the reasonableness test. Indeed, the impact of this approach is 
best exemplified when compared against the strong prejudice 
requirements propounded by the majority. Recall that in 
MicroStrategy, Lauricia was terminated from her position as the 
head of MicroStrategy’s Human Resources Department.451 Within 
six months of her firing, MicroStrategy filed three separate 
claims against Lauricia before demanding arbitration—one in 
state court and two in federal court.452 Finally, although we are 
told only that the parties “agreed” to the arbitral procedures in 
question,453 let us assume that Lauricia, as a high level employee, 
negotiated these procedures. At trial, the district court held that 
MicroStrategy waived its right to arbitrate, finding that its 
“remarkably aggressive” pretrial conduct and extensive discovery 
prejudiced Lauricia.454 
On appeal, let us assume the Fourth Circuit has replaced the 
waiver doctrine with the reasonableness test. Thus, the question 
before the court is whether MicroStrategy’s six-month delay in 
demanding arbitration was unreasonable. If so, the court will 
consider Lauricia’s duty to arbitrate discharged and continue 
litigation; if not, then the court will stay further proceedings and 
compel arbitration.  
First, the relevant period in which to consider delay should 
begin when a party files a claim in court because any delay 
should coincide with pretrial conduct.455 Once that point is 
identified, the court should begin its analysis by considering the 
                                                                                                     
 451. See MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Lauricia, 268 F.3d 244, 246 (4th Cir. 2001) 
(discussing Lauricia’s employment at MicroStrategy). 
 452. See id. at 247–50 (discussing the claims and the time frame within 
which MicroStrategy filed its claims against Lauricia).  
 453. Id. at 251. 
 454. Lauricia v. MicroStrategy, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 489, 492–93 (E.D. Va. 
2000). 
 455. See supra Part II (discussing how conduct-based waiver has been the 
focus of the circuits and the issue upon which the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari).  
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nature and object of the parties’ arbitration agreement. It should 
do so, however, in light of the discrete benefits derived through 
arbitration, and the inherent destabilizing effect of judicial 
involvement.456 Further, the court should consider the nature of 
the arbitral procedures for which the parties contracted. For 
example, if the parties’ arbitration agreement provides for 
expedited procedures, whether ad hoc or institutional,457 the court 
should be far less willing to tolerate delay. In this hypothetical, 
the arbitration clause requires only that the parties arbitrate 
“any controversy or claim arising out of . . . th[e] Employee 
Handbook.”458 Thus, although expedited arbitral review is not in 
question, the inherent destabilization caused by the judicial 
forum is important to keep in mind moving forward in the 
analysis. 
Next, the court should consider whether the parties’ prior 
conduct manifests a desire to carry out the arbitration agreement 
as intended. As the period for consideration begins when one 
party files a claim, the court should consider which party first 
filed the claim, the extent of the parties’ litigation activity, and 
the nature of the parties’ relationship (i.e., whether they were 
attempting to ameliorate their differences throughout the pretrial 
process). First, it is particularly significant that MicroStrategy 
filed three separate complaints after it learned of Lauricia’s 
employment discrimination charges.459 Such conduct shows a 
clear intent to avoid the arbitral forum, or perhaps that more 
suspect motives are in play. Second, MicroStrategy engaged in 
“remarkably aggressive” litigation conduct, as it deposed Laurcia, 
seized a number of documents, obtained numerous responses to 
interrogatories, and obtained Lauricia’s personal information, all 
before demanding arbitration.460 Third, after MicroStrategy filed 
                                                                                                     
 456. See supra Part II (describing the benefits of arbitration). 
 457. For a useful example of expedited arbitral procedures, see AAA RULES, 
supra note 58, at 42. 
 458. MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Lauricia, 268 F.3d 244, 246 (4th Cir. 2001) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 459. See id. at 246–48 (describing the complaints filed by MicroStrategy).  
 460. See id. at 254 (noting that “MicroStrategy deposed Lauricia, 
successfully sought the seizure of documents, . . . received responses from 
Lauricia to interrogatories and requests to produce, and obtained Lauricia’s 
employment records from her former employers”).  
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its first two claims, the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission invited the parties to participate in a “conciliation 
process.”461 Lauricia, however, declined the invitation and 
requested that she be issued her “right-to-sue letter” 
immediately.462 Thus, it is apparent that the parties’ relationship 
had completely deteriorated by the time MicroStrategy demanded 
arbitration. Ultimately, the above considerations show that 
MicroStrategy had no desire to exercise the arbitration 
agreement as intended—that is, to curb the costs and delays 
appurtenant to litigation through mutually beneficial arbitral 
procedures.463 Rather, it sought to exhaust Lauricia’s emotional 
and economic reserves by manipulating the arbitral process.464 As 
it is unlikely that Laurcia intended, or expected, this result, 
MicroStrategy’s conduct drives the analysis toward 
unreasonableness. 
Third, the court should consider the extent to which Lauricia 
would suffer prejudice if MicroStrategy’s delay were found 
reasonable. Conceptually, it is appropriate to maintain the 
circuits’ notions of prejudice (i.e., costs, delay, and damage to a 
party’s legal position through pretrial activity), as the other 
factors in the reasonableness test inform these considerations.465 
Critically, however, the court should consider expense and delay 
alone, the very harms sought to be avoided through arbitration,466 
sufficient to warrant a finding of prejudice.467 Therefore, it is 
much more likely that Lauricia would be found prejudiced under 
the reasonableness test. Although MicroStrategy’s six-month 
delay was not particularly egregious, Lauricia was forced to 
engage in substantial pretrial activity at great personal 
                                                                                                     
 461. Id. at 247.  
 462. Id.  
 463. See supra Part II (discussing the benefits derived, and expected, 
through bargained-for arbitral procedures).  
 464. See MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Lauricia, 268 F.3d 244, 254 (4th Cir. 2001) 
(describing how MicroStrategy, through its aggressive litigation conduct, sought 
to “wear[] [Lauricia] out, both emotionally and financially”).  
 465. See supra Part III (discussing the various considerations encompassed 
within each circuit’s prejudice analysis).   
 466. See supra Part II (discussing the benefits of arbitration).  
 467. See supra notes 279–80 and accompanying text (discussing the First 
Circuit’s rationale for finding undue delay and costs, in and of themselves, 
sufficient to warrant a finding of prejudice).  
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expense.468 Despite the presence of prejudice under the 
reasonableness test, however, let us assume that the court 
refused to find prejudice for illustrative purposes. 
The final step in the reasonableness test is to consider 
whether a movant is attempting to exercise the arbitration 
agreement in bad faith. In doing so, the court should keep in 
mind that FAA § 3 allows recourse to the judicial forum.469 As 
such, merely filing a claim should not trigger a finding of bad 
faith. Rather, the court should deny only those demands which 
contradict the “spirit,” or “defeat the purposes,” of the parties’ 
arbitration agreement.470 Other factors, such as the parties’ prior 
conduct and the degree of prejudice suffered by the nonmovant, 
should be informative. In this hypothetical, MicroStrategy’s 
“remarkably aggressive” pretrial conduct is strongly indicative of 
bad faith.471 It moved to compel arbitration only after inflicting 
significant costs.472 Further, its aggressive use of pretrial 
discovery evinced a willful desire to evade the arbitral framework 
in favor of one more propitious to its cause.473 Therefore, the court 
should find that MicroStrategy willfully evaded the spirit of the 
parties’ agreement and, thus, exercised its arbitral rights in bad 
faith. Indeed, such a finding should be strongly indicative, if not 
dispositive, of unreasonable delay.474 
                                                                                                     
 468. See Lauricia, 268 F.3d at 250–51 (finding “no doubt” that 
MicroStrategy’s pretrial conduct “involved the expenditure of substantial sums 
of money by all involved”). 
 469. See 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2011) (permitting parties to stay judicial proceedings 
pending arbitration, implying that some recourse to a judicial forum before 
exercising arbitral rights is permissible). 
 470. Publishers’ Ass’n of N.Y. City v. N.Y. Newspaper Printing Pressmen’s 
Union Number Two, 145 N.Y.S.2d 93, 96–97 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955). 
 471. MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Lauricia, 268 F.3d 244, 248 (4th Cir. 2001) 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. d (1981) (citing “evasion of the spirit of the bargain” and 
“willful rendering of imperfect performance” as particular examples of bad 
faith). 
 472. See Lauricia, 268 F.3d at 250–51 (finding that Lauricia was forced to 
pay “substantial sums of money” engaging in pretrial conduct).  
 473. See id. at 250, 254 (noting that, “[u]nder the rules by which the parties 
agreed to arbitrate,” discovery was available but “under standards different 
from those governing discovery in federal court,” particularly because the 
arbitrator had more discretion to determine what materials were discoverable). 
 474. See, e.g., Smith v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co., 697 N.E.2d 168, 170 (N.Y. 
1998) (finding per se liability for insurers who refuse settlement offers in bad 
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Overall, although there was neither any prejudice nor 
significant temporal delay, the court should find MicroStrategy’s 
delayed performance unreasonable. Focusing squarely on the 
parties’ pretrial conduct, it was clear that MicroStrategy did not 
attempt to exercise its arbitral rights as intended. Further, its 
conduct rose to the level of bad faith performance, as it willfully 
turned cost-effective, stabilizing procedures into weapons of 
financial malaise and delay. Therefore, the court should hold 
Lauricia’s duty to arbitrate discharged under the reasonableness 
test. 
4. The Efficacy of the “Reasonableness Test” as Compared 
to Waiver 
The above paradigm illustrates how the reasonableness test 
would improve upon the waiver doctrine in three key respects. 
First, the reasonableness test would unify and standardize the 
method for determining at what point a party, through pretrial 
conduct, has lost its right to arbitrate. The test is fundamentally 
aimed toward protecting parties’ legitimate, contractual 
expectations. This unitary focus, coupled with the severability 
doctrine’s magnifying effect, would center the analysis on 
preserving the discrete benefits derived through arbitral 
procedures—stability and predictability.475 The resulting 
approach thus provides an analytic framework,476 capable of 
uniform federal application,477 to which parties can look for 
                                                                                                     
faith); Goodstein Constr. Corp. v. City of N.Y., 604 N.E.2d 1356, 1358–59 (N.Y. 
1992) (finding that a cause of action based upon allegations of bad faith in the 
real estate context are sufficient to entitle recovery for damages); Murphy v. 
Am. Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 91 (N.Y. 1983) (stating that, generally, 
“an obligation of good faith and fair dealing on the part of a party to a contract 
may be implied and, if implied will be enforced” (emphasis added)).  
 475. See supra Part II (describing how arbitration benefits parties’ 
underlying contractual arrangements).  
 476. See supra note 34 and accompanying test (describing how businesses 
which use arbitration clauses in their contractual arrangements desire a stable, 
“analytical framework” in order to facilitate both dispute resolution planning 
and establishing arbitral procedures).  
 477. Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896, 1902 (2009) (stating 
that FAA § 2 creates “substantive federal law” which incorporates traditional 
state contract law principles).  
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certainty when establishing arbitral procedures. Further, both 
the prejudice and the rebuttal standards instill a complete lack of 
focus, hinging parties’ arbitral rights on undefined standards of 
pretrial conduct.478 Conversely, the reasonableness test 
subordinates prejudice, making it a mere factor in a larger 
analysis geared toward preserving parties’ expectations. Because 
parties expect stability, courts would be far less likely to tolerate 
dilatory “heads I win, tails you lose” pretrial strategies.479 If 
courts effectively police such strategies, parties would be far less 
likely to attempt them from the outset. Thus, by preventing 
dilatory pretrial conduct, the reasonableness test would further 
stabilize the arbitral process. 
Second, the reasonableness test would realign the standard 
for assessing parties’ pretrial conduct with FAA’s overarching 
objective.480 First, its purely contractual methodology comports 
with the notion that arbitration is simply a matter of contract.481 
Both the discharge and the reasonableness concepts stem from 
generally applicable contract law principles.482 Furthermore, the 
reasonableness test is aimed directly toward upholding parties’ 
legitimate expectations, a “fundamental principal” of contract 
law.483 To be sure, fewer disputes in all may be referred to 
arbitration, at least in the short term. This would not, however, 
contravene the liberal federal policy favoring arbitration 
agreements. Rather, as the policy merely reflects FAA § 2’s 
substantive mandate—enforcement of arbitration agreements as 
contracts—the reasonableness test falls directly within its 
confines.484 The circuits’ current analyses, however, do not. 
                                                                                                     
 478. See supra Part III (describing the circuit split and each circuit’s ill-
defined prejudice requirement).  
 479. See Cabinetree of Wis., Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 388, 
391 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 480. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) 
(“The overarching purpose of the FAA . . . is to ensure the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined 
proceedings.”). 
 481. See id. at 1752 (“Arbitration is a matter of contract . . . .”). 
 482. See supra notes 421, 427–28 and accompanying text (discussing the 
discharge and reasonableness principles under contract law).  
 483. Steven J. Burton, More on Good Faith Performance of a Contract: A 
Reply to Professor Summers, 69 IOWA L. REV. 497, 506 (1984). 
 484. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746 (“The FAA . . . places arbitration 
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Indeed, parties can neither waive nor forfeit an autonomous 
contract, the very regard in which arbitration agreements are 
held under the severability doctrine. Thus, both standards 
propound approaches clearly rejected by contract law and, as a 
result, the FAA.485 
Furthermore, endless litigation over the details of 
prejudice,486 or rebuttal, impugns the FAA’s second underlying 
goal—to “facilitate streamlined proceedings.”487 Under the 
reasonableness test, however, disputes deemed referable to 
arbitration would be both contractually legitimate (i.e., tested 
against bad faith) and consigned expeditiously under a 
predictable framework. Thus, the reasonableness test would 
unite the FAA’s two goals, rather than frustrate both of them—a 
result clearly favored by the Supreme Court.488 Ultimately, the 
reasonableness framework accomplishes the FAA’s overarching 
objective to a greater extent than waiver both doctrinally and 
efficaciously. 
Third and finally, the reasonableness test would prevent bad 
faith manipulation of the arbitral process. Indeed, bargained-for 
arbitral procedures confer significant benefits upon parties’ 
contractual relationships.489 Ensuring that parties exercise their 
arbitral rights in good faith, a requirement of all contractual 
arrangements,490 will ensure that they receive the benefit of their 
                                                                                                     
agreements on an equal footing with other contracts . . . .” (citations omitted)); 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 
(1985) (“The liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements . . . is at 
bottom a policy guaranteeing the enforcement of private contractual 
arrangements . . . .”).   
 485. See supra Part IV (discussing the doctrinal inaccuracies of applying the 
waiver doctrine and forfeiture in the context of analyzing a party’s arbitral 
rights).  
 486. See Erdman Co. v. Phoenix Land & Acquisition, LLC, 650 F.3d 1115, 
1120 (8th Cir. 2011) (finding that requiring parties to “litigate endlessly over the 
details of prejudice” makes little sense in certain circumstances). 
 487. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011). 
 488. See id. at 1749 (stating explicitly that its holding causes the FAA’s two 
goals to coincide, but eschewing the dissent’s approach in that it “would 
frustrate both of them” (emphasis in original)).  
 489. See supra Part II (discussing the benefits derived through established 
arbitral procedures).  
 490. See supra note 439 and accompanying text (noting that a covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing is implied in all contractual arrangements).  
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bargain in accordance with contract law.491 Thus, the 
reasonableness test provides not only a doctrinally accurate 
approach, but an equitable approach. 
VI. Conclusion 
Arbitration is, quite simply, a matter of contract.492 It is “a 
private process to which the parties have agreed, and the courts’ 
only obligation is to uphold that agreement pursuant to 
established arbitration and contract law.”493 Despite this 
obligation’s intrinsic simplicity, the Circuit Courts of Appeals 
have consistently failed to uphold arbitration agreements as 
contracts, often to the detriment of parties’ arbitral rights. They 
have yanked the liberal federal policy favoring arbitration from 
its contractual roots,494 and use it to justify doctrinally 
inaccurate,495 manipulative results.496 
The Supreme Court has recently stated that the FAA’s 
overarching objective is “to enforce arbitration agreements 
according to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined 
proceedings.”497 The reasonableness test proposed by this Note is 
precisely what the Supreme Court requires—a purely contractual 
approach which accomplishes the FAA’s objective. Further, it 
provides a comprehensive framework which would unify the 
circuit courts’ analyses and stabilize the arbitral process in 
                                                                                                     
 491. See Burton, supra note 483, at 506 (stating that ensuring parties’ 
legitimate expectations is a fundamental aspect of contract law).  
 492. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995) (noting 
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accordance with parties’ legitimate expectations.498 Under this 
approach, arbitration will remain, simply, a matter of contract. 
                                                                                                     
 498. See supra Part II (discussing how the stabilizing effect provided by 
bargained-for arbitral procedures is lost without a predictable legal framework).  
